Kerala High CourtEmployment and Labour LawAdministrative and Public Law

Director's overall management role remains subject to Executive Committee control, classifying him as "employee" under PoSH Act.

PROF. (DR.) J. SUNDARESAN PILLAIv.DR. K.K. SEETHALAKSHMI

Director's overall management role remains subject to Executive Committee control, classifying him as "employee" under PoSH Act.. PROF. (DR.) J. SUNDARESAN PILLAI vs DR. K.K. SEETHALAKSHMI. Kerala High Court. LawLens
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In brief

The question

1. Whether the Director of IRTC falls under the definition of "employer" or "employee" as per the PoSH Act, and consequently, whether the ICC or the LC has the jurisdiction to enquire into the complaint

The court held

The court answered the issue by holding that the appellant is an "employee" for the purposes of the PoSH Act and the ICC is the competent authority to investigate the allegations

It also directed

The court found no perversity or illegality in the Single Judge’s judgment and dismissed the writ appeal

The ICC proceedings were allowed to continue, with the clarification that the complainant (even if a member of the ICC) shall not participate in the decision-making process regarding her own complaint

01Facts

The appellant, the Director of the Integrated Rural Technology Centre (IRTC), challenged a judgment of the learned Single Judge that dismissed his writ petition.

The litigation arose after a female employee lodged a sexual harassment complaint against the appellant on 27.11.2024

p. 3

The Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) issued a notice for the appellant to appear

p. 3

The appellant contended that as "Director," he is the "employer" under Section 2(g) of the PoSH Act, and therefore, under Section 6(1), the complaint should be heard by the Local Committee (LC) rather than the ICC

pp. 3-4

He further alleged a conflict of interest with the ICC Presiding Officer

p. 4

02Issues

i.1. Whether the Director of IRTC falls under the definition of "employer" or "employee" as per the PoSH Act, and consequently, whether the ICC or the LC has the jurisdiction to enquire into the complaint

p. 8 · ¶ 9

03Law Applied

Section 2(f) defines "employee" broadly to include those in regular or ad hoc positions

p. 9, para 11

Section 2(g)(ii) defines "employer" as the person responsible for the management, supervision, and control of the workplace, noting that "management" includes boards/committees responsible for policy formulation

pp. 9-10, para 12

Section 4 mandates the constitution of an ICC

p. 10

Section 6(1) provides that the Local Committee shall receive complaints only if the ICC is not constituted or "if the complaint is against the employer himself"

p. 12, para 14

Provisions in the judgment · 6 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 Section 2Section 4Section 5Section 6Section 9Section 16

04Reasoning

Although the appellant argued that his role as Chief Executive Officer and his "overall management" duties under Clause 23.2.2 of the MoA made him the "employer", the court observed that Clause 7.1 and 18.1 vest the ultimate control, administration, and management of the Society in the General Body and Executive Committee

pp. 14-16

Clause 23.2.1 explicitly states the Director is appointed by the Executive Committee and works subject to their control and supervision

p. 17

The court reasoned that since the appellant is an appointee accountable to a higher governing body (the Executive Committee), he holds the status of an "employee" rather than the ultimate "employer"

pp. 19-20, para 18

Consequently, the exception under Section 6(1) of the PoSH Act does not apply, and the ICC retains jurisdiction.

05Holding

The court answered the issue by holding that the appellant is an "employee" for the purposes of the PoSH Act and the ICC is the competent authority to investigate the allegations

p. 20, para 18

The court found no perversity or illegality in the Single Judge’s judgment and dismissed the writ appeal

p. 20

The ICC proceedings were allowed to continue, with the clarification that the complainant (even if a member of the ICC) shall not participate in the decision-making process regarding her own complaint

p. 20, para 18
Kerala High Court

Original Court PDF

PROF. (DR.) J. SUNDARESAN PILLAIvsDR. K.K. SEETHALAKSHMI

Kerala High Court · May 19, 2026

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