### Discharge Not an Interlocutory Order; Proper Remedy is Revision, Not Appeal

The Appellant (prosecutrix) alleged that Respondent No. 2 (the accused) coerced her into establishing physical relations against her will after she demanded the return of her gold articles

Following an investigation into FIR No. 7/2023, a chargesheet was filed under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)

On 02.08.2024, the Additional Sessions Judge, Special Fast Track Court, Saket, passed an order discharging the accused on the grounds that no *prima facie* case or strong suspicion of the offence was established

The Appellant challenged this discharge order by filing a criminal appeal under Section 413 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) read with Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.)

Whether an appeal is maintainable against an order discharging an accused, or if the appropriate remedy lies in a criminal revision

Whether the court can proceed to decide the matter on merits in the absence of the Appellant

The court primarily applied the procedural distinction between interlocutory and final orders under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C.

It relied on the principle that the discharge of an accused is not an interlocutory order, thereby making it subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the court under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C.

The court further applied the precedent of *Bani Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. (1996)*, which permits a court to determine an appeal on merits even if the appellant or their counsel fails to appear

Additionally, the court cited *Haryana LRB Corporation Limited v. State of Haryana (1990)* to affirm that a revision, rather than an appeal, is the proper remedy against a discharge order

The court observed that despite the Appellant’s consistent absence, the matter could be decided on its merits based on the judicial record as per the *Bani Singh* dictum

In examining the maintainability of the petition, the court noted that the Appellant had filed a criminal appeal against an order of discharge

However, the court reasoned that a discharge order—unlike a mere procedural interlocutory step—is a substantive determination that no *prima facie* case exists, and such orders do not fall under the bar of Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.

Following established precedents, the court held that since the order of the trial court effectively terminated the proceedings against the accused, the legal remedy available to the aggrieved party is a revision under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C., not an appeal under Section 372 Cr.P.C. or Section 413 BNSS

Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal and closed all pending applications