Disciplinary authorities cannot initiate de novo inquiries on identical charges by bypassing concluded inquiry reports.

The petitioner, a Water Supply and Sanitation Engineer, was subjected to a departmental inquiry under the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 ("1979 Rules") regarding allegations of misconduct raised in 2020.

Following a memorandum of charge dated 17.08.2023, a regular inquiry was conducted and a report was submitted to the competent authority.

Instead of acting upon the report or furnishing a copy to the petitioner, Respondent No. 2 issued an order on 24.12.2025 directing a de novo inquiry and appointing a new Inquiry Officer.

The petitioner sought to quash this order, arguing that the disciplinary authority cannot ignore a concluded inquiry and start afresh on the same charges.

Whether, after an inquiry under Rule 8 has been concluded and a report submitted, the disciplinary authority can ignore said report and direct a de novo inquiry on the same charges by appointing a new Inquiry Officer.

Whether the statutory scheme of Rule 9 of the 1979 Rules permits successive inquiries on the same charge-sheet.

Rule 9 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979, which governs the procedure for action on an inquiry report.

The Supreme Court decision in K.R. Deb v. Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, which established that service jurisprudence does not permit successive inquiries on the same charge-sheet in the absence of statutory authority.

Principles from Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra and Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra, holding that natural justice mandates providing the delinquent employee with the inquiry report and tentative reasons for disagreement before recording final findings.

The Court found that the statutory scheme of Rule 9 provides three specific options upon receipt of an inquiry report: (i) remit the case for further (not fresh) inquiry with recorded reasons [Rule 9(1)]; (ii) forward the report and tentative reasons for disagreement to the employee for representation [Rule 9(2)]; or (iii) proceed to determine the penalty.

The Court reasoned that the Rules do not envisage ignoring a concluded report to commence an entirely new inquiry.

The impugned order's direction for a "de novo inquiry" was held to be fundamentally infirm as it bypassed the existing report and failed to communicate reasons for the authority's dissatisfaction to the petitioner.

The Court rejected the respondents' argument that the petitioner’s participation in the second inquiry cured the defect, stating that such participation cannot validate an order that is ex facie beyond the scope of the governing rules.

The authority's power is structured by Rule 9 and is not unbridled.

The Court partly allowed the petition and quashed the impugned order dated 24.12.2025.

Respondent No. 2 was directed to furnish the petitioner with a copy of the original inquiry report within two weeks and was granted liberty to proceed only from the stage at which the first report was received, strictly following the procedural requirements of Rule 9, including recording tentative reasons for any disagreement and considering the petitioner's representation.