Disciplinary authority’s reasoned orders based on evidence are not to be set aside.

Smt. Sunita Rani, appointed as LDC in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan on October 28, 1992, was suspended on September 19, 2002, due to charges leveled against her.

An inquiry was conducted, leading to a punishment of removal from service by order dated June 8, 2006.

Her appeal on July 26, 2006, was rejected on January 17, 2007.

The applicant then filed Original Application No. 186 of 2007 before the Tribunal, which directed her to prefer a revision petition.

This revision petition was also rejected by order dated September 16, 2009.

The applicant contended that the punishment was excessively harsh, based on false charges, and that the inquiry violated rules and statutory provisions.

The respondents countered that serious offenses, including misuse of the Principal's letterhead and stamp, were committed, and the inquiry was conducted per rules.

1. Whether the orders dated September 16, 2009, January 17, 2007, and June 8, 2006, passed by the reviewing, appellate, and disciplinary authorities respectively, merit quashing.

2. Whether the inquiry proceedings were vitiated due to alleged bias of the inquiry officer, non-supply of demanded documents, examination of an unlisted witness (the Principal), pressure on prosecution witnesses, or non-existence of the security agency.

3. Whether the mandatory provision of Rule 14(18) of CCS (CCA) Rules was violated, causing prejudice to the applicant.

4. Whether the punishment of removal from service was disproportionate to the gravity of the charges proved against the applicant.

The Tribunal applied the principles of natural justice, emphasizing the requirement for administrative authorities exercising quasi-judicial functions to record reasons for their decisions to ensure fairness and prevent arbitrariness, as established in *S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India* (1990 AIR 1984).

It also considered the legal precedent from *Mool Chandra v. Union of India & Anr* (2024 INSC 577) regarding the setting aside of disciplinary findings due to a lack of evidence.

The court further referenced *Jasram Jat v. Inspector General of Police, Ajmer Range, Ajmer* for the necessity of speaking orders from disciplinary and appellate authorities.

The court referenced *Amar Pal Singh v. Union of India and others* (OA No. 1461 of 2015) concerning the mandatory nature of Rule 14(18) of CCS (CCA) Rules regarding the interrogation of the charged official.

For the quantum of punishment, the settled position of law requires consideration of factors like gravity of misconduct, past conduct, nature of duties, position, previous penalty, and required discipline.

The Tribunal first addressed the maintainability of issues not raised in the first OA, concluding that the direction to file a fresh review implied the review authority would consider all issues raised by the applicant.

Regarding the alleged bias of the inquiry officer, the Tribunal noted that the applicant had participated in the inquiry and submitted a defense brief after the allegations of bias were decided, thus rejecting this ground.

On the non-supply of documents, the court found that the applicant failed to establish prejudice due to non-supply, as the relevancy of documents had been decided and a defense assistant had inspected records and obtained photocopies.

The examination of the Principal as a witness, though not listed, was deemed acceptable for a just conclusion given the details in the charge sheet, aligning with the principle that unlisted witnesses can be examined if essential.

The argument that prosecution witnesses were under pressure was dismissed; as they were present at the occurrence (many being fellow employees), they were considered natural witnesses, and decisions in disciplinary proceedings rely on a preponderance of probability.

The applicant's contention about the non-existence of the security agency was found without cogent evidence, as the owner himself appeared as a witness.

The claim that criminal proceedings against the Principal vitiated disciplinary proceedings was rejected, as both are independent.

The court found that Rule 14(18) of CCS (CCA) Rules was not violated as the applicant and her defense assistant had ample opportunity to participate and filed a defense brief.

Finally, the Tribunal affirmed that Charge No. 1 was not proved, Charge No. 2 was partially proved, and Charges No. 3 and 4 were fully proved, based on evidence including the applicant's admission of misusing the Principal's letterhead and stamp.

This conduct, lacking authority, justified the punishment imposed, which was deemed commensurate with the gravity of the charges.

The punishment imposed was found to be proportionate to the gravity of the charges proved, especially considering the applicant's admitted misuse of official resources without authority.

Therefore, the instant original application was dismissed as being devoid of merits.

All associated miscellaneous applications were also disposed of.