Disciplinary findings warrant no interference absent procedural unfairness, perversity, or lack of evidence.

The applicant, an Assistant Audit Officer, was charged following an audit at the Joint Director of Health Services, Krishnagiri, in September 2014. The charges alleged, among other things, that he visited non-selected units and demanded or accepted money from the auditee department.

After a departmental inquiry, the Inquiry Authority found the charges proved except the allegation concerning acceptance of money for boarding, lodging and other expenses. The Disciplinary Authority imposed a penalty, and the Appellate Authority upheld it.

The applicant challenged the orders, alleging denial of natural justice, procedural irregularities, bias, and retrospective application of Rule 3(1)(vi) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

1. Whether the disciplinary inquiry and resulting orders were vitiated by a violation of natural justice or procedural irregularity, including in the identification process and the rejection of the applicant’s request to change the Inquiry Officer.

2. Whether Rule 3(1)(vi) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964, was impermissibly applied retrospectively to conduct alleged to have occurred before its insertion.

3. Whether the Tribunal could interfere with the disciplinary findings or penalty under the applicable standard of judicial review.

Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, governs departmental inquiries, which must comply with prescribed procedure and the principles of natural justice. The CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964, including Rule 3(1)(i), (iii) and (vi), were cited in connection with integrity, conduct unbecoming of a government servant, and ethical standards.

Relying on State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557, the Tribunal stated that judicial review is supervisory, not appellate: findings may be disturbed for procedural or natural-justice violations, legal error, no evidence, or perversity, but not merely because the evidence is considered insufficient or inadequate.

Under C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, the disciplinary and appellate authorities determine the facts and penalty; a reviewing court or tribunal ordinarily cannot substitute its own penalty, subject to intervention where the punishment shocks the conscience.

The Tribunal concluded that the applicant had been given adequate opportunities to defend himself and that the inquiry had been conducted under the prescribed procedure. It found no established jurisdictional or procedural infirmity, substantiated mala fides, or basis to conclude that the authorities’ findings lacked evidentiary support or were perverse.

On retrospectivity, the respondents’ position was that Rule 3(1)(vi) applied only to Article II, which the Inquiry Authority had not found proved; the Tribunal did not separately elaborate on this contention.

Applying the limited-review principles in Chitra Venkata Rao and C. Chaturvedi, it declined to reappraise the evidence or interfere with the authorities’ conclusions and penalty.

The judgment contains an apparent inconsistency in its account of the penalty: paragraph 12 describes reduction to the lower post for three years, while paragraph 15 refers to reduction by one stage for one year. The dismissal is clear, but the penalty description is not consistent across the judgment.