Disciplinary Inquiries Against Judicial Officers Do Not Require a Sworn Complaint if Initiated on Information.

The petitioner, a serving Additional District Judge, was placed under suspension on 16.12.2024.

A charge-sheet was issued on 25.1.2025 containing six charges, including allegations of intimate relations with an outsourced clerk, utilizing court staff for her business, blocking CCTV cameras, irregularity in court sittings, and threatening witnesses.

The petitioner challenged the inquiry and suspension through various applications and two withdrawn Supreme Court writ petitions.

During the pendency of the current petition, after judgment was reserved on 15.4.2026, the petitioner independently filed a written submission on affidavit—without his counsel's knowledge—asserting that he lost confidence in the Gujarat High Court because a senior judge allegedly "controls" junior judges.

1. Whether the initiation of a departmental inquiry and charge-sheet against a judicial officer is vitiated if it is not preceded by a written complaint accompanied by a sworn affidavit and verifiable material.

2. Whether the statements made by the petitioner in paragraph 2 of his written submissions regarding a senior judge of the High Court constitute criminal contempt.

The Court applied Rule 23 of the Gujarat Judicial Service Rules, 2005, which incorporates the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971 for judicial officers.

Rule 9(2) of the 1971 Rules empowers the Disciplinary Authority to initiate an inquiry whenever it is of the "opinion" that there are grounds to investigate misconduct.

The Court further interpreted the Ministry of Law and Justice Guidelines (dated 31.12.2014), clarifying that the requirement for sworn affidavits applies strictly to complaints filed by litigants to prevent frivolous harassment, and does not curtail the High Court's inherent disciplinary powers under Article 235 of the Constitution.

Regarding contempt, the Court applied the Contempt of Courts Act, noting that scandalizing the court or lowering its authority constitutes criminal contempt.

The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that a sworn affidavit is a prerequisite for an inquiry, holding that the Disciplinary Authority’s power under Rule 9(2) is absolute and triggered by the mere formation of an "opinion" based on any information received.

The Court reasoned that the 2014 Guidelines were intended to shield judges from "disgruntled litigants," not to act as a "shield" for judicial officers against the High Court's own disciplinary oversight.

It distinguished the petitioner's previous litigation (SCA 11804/2017), noting that statutory rules prevail over administrative guidelines.

Regarding the petitioner's affidavit, the Court found that alleging a senior judge "controls" or "directs" junior judges is a direct attempt to scandalize the judiciary and obstruct the administration of justice, thereby meeting the threshold for criminal contempt.

The Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the departmental inquiry was legally initiated despite the absence of a formal sworn complaint.

On Issue 2, the Court found the petitioner's assertions to be prima facie contemptuous and directed the registry to place the matter before the appropriate Division Bench for the initiation of criminal contempt proceedings.

The petitioner was ordered to be personally present before the contempt bench on 15.06.2026.