Disciplinary proceedings for quasi-judicial functions unsustainable without malafide intent or extraneous considerations.

The applicant, Dr. Anand Kishore Pandey, an Income Tax Officer (ITO), was issued a major penalty Charge Memorandum dated December 12, 2022 (Annex.A/1) by Respondent No. 3, the Disciplinary Authority.

The charges alleged that while serving as ITO Ward Nos. 3 & 7 at Vapi from August 2014 to May 2017, he failed to maintain assessment records as per the Manual of Office Procedure (MOP) Vol. II and completed assessments without due diligence, failing to bring correct taxable income.

The applicant had previously provided a detailed response to a vigilance inspection in December 2021, believing the matter closed.

Upon receiving the charge memorandum, he requested inspection of original records and relied upon documents (RUDs), which was initially not provided, leading him to submit an interim reply.

He later submitted a detailed defense without full access to RUDs.

The disciplinary authority subsequently appointed Respondent No. 4 as the Inquiring Authority and Respondent No. 5 as the Presenting Officer on June 5, 2023.

The applicant contended that his actions were performed in a quasi-judicial capacity as an Assessing Officer and therefore could not constitute misconduct, especially without allegations of mala fide or gratification, and pointed out the delay in initiating proceedings.

He further highlighted the Income Tax Department's own stand before the Apex Court that the MOP Vol. II is not binding on officials.

1. Whether the allegations leveled against the applicant, concerning decisions taken in his capacity as a quasi-judicial authority (Assessing Officer), constitute "misconduct" warranting disciplinary proceedings?

2. Whether the impugned Charge Memorandum and subsequent orders are legally sustainable, given the nature of the applicant's duties and the absence of allegations of mala fide, recklessness, or extraneous considerations?

3. Whether the impugned charge memorandum suffers from the vice of delay?

The Tribunal primarily applied the principle that an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acts independently and that an erroneous exercise of such power does not constitute misconduct unless accompanied by mala fide, recklessness, arbitrary action, corrupt motive, or extraneous considerations.

Key precedents include Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India and Others [(1999) 7 SCC 409], which held that wrong exercise of jurisdiction or mistake of law by a quasi-judicial authority cannot be the basis for disciplinary proceedings.

While acknowledging Union of India & Ors. vs. K.K. Dhawan [(1993) 2 SCC 56], which listed circumstances for disciplinary action (e.g., integrity, recklessness, undue favour), the Tribunal emphasized that K.K. Dhawan must be read in the context of allegations beyond mere erroneous decisions.

The Tribunal also referred to Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad & Anr. [(2007) 4 SCC 247], affirming that strong grounds to suspect bona fides, malice, bias, or illegality are required for disciplinary action based on a judicial order.

The legal maxim "sublato fundamento cadit opus" (when the foundation is removed, the superstructure falls) was also invoked.

The judgment in UOI Vs. S. Rajguru, W.P. (C) No. 5113/2014, upheld by the Supreme Court, was cited as squarely applicable, establishing that a mere error of fact or law cannot form the basis of departmental proceedings against a quasi-judicial authority.

The Tribunal also considered the protection under Section 293 of the Income Tax Act and the Judges Protection Act, 1985.

The Tribunal found that the charges against the applicant primarily concerned his decisions as an Assessing Officer, a role recognized as quasi-judicial.

The core allegation was that he rendered "erroneous" decisions, failed to maintain records as per the MOP Vol. II, and did not exercise "due diligence".

However, the Tribunal emphasized that the department itself had argued before the Apex Court that the MOP Vol. II is not binding.

Applying the principles from S. Rajguru (upheld by the Supreme Court), the Tribunal reasoned that mere errors of fact or law, or procedural lapses in a quasi-judicial function, do not constitute misconduct unless coupled with strong evidence of mala fide, corrupt motives, recklessness, or actions to unduly favor a party.

The court noted that there were no allegations of bribery, personal gain, or corrupt motive against the applicant.

The essence of the charges related to the correctness of his decisions, not his conduct in a manner reflecting on integrity or good faith.

Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that such departmental proceedings, founded solely on alleged procedural irregularities or errors in quasi-judicial acts, were legally unsustainable.

The Tribunal did not specifically address the issue of delay.

The allegations leveled, pertaining to the applicant's duties as a quasi-judicial authority (Assessing Officer) during 2014-2017, did not constitute misconduct in the absence of any mala fide conduct, corrupt motive, or extraneous considerations.

Consequently, the O.A. was allowed, and the impugned Charge Memorandum dated December 12, 2022 (Annex. A/1), was quashed and set aside.

The interim order restraining further proceedings was made absolute.