Dismissal is unsustainable where denial of defence witnesses breaches natural justice.

The petitioner, a constable appointed in the Bihar Police on 10 February 1994, was posted in the Sitamarhi District Police. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him through a charge memo dated 20 September 2000 alleging unauthorised absence, fighting in an intoxicated condition and firing, non-deposit of his service revolver and cartridges, and related misconduct.

The petitioner contended that, before the charge memo, no show-cause notice was issued as required under paragraph 1 of Appendix 49 of the Bihar Police Manual.

During the enquiry, he sought permission to examine defence witnesses and relied on medical documents concerning the illness of his child. He also claimed that he was not supplied the statements of prosecution witnesses and was therefore unable to effectively cross-examine them.

The Enquiry Officer submitted a report finding the charges proved on 19 February 2001. After a second show-cause notice, the Superintendent of Police, Sitamarhi dismissed the petitioner on 12 July 2001.

His statutory appeal, memorial, and subsequent review representations were rejected on 29 October 2002, 20 February 2003, and 18 November 2013 respectively.

A criminal case arising out of substantially the same allegations resulted in the petitioner’s acquittal by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chapra, on 11 June 2009.

Whether the departmental enquiry was vitiated by denial of a reasonable opportunity to defend, including refusal to permit defence evidence and failure to supply witness statements.

Whether the disciplinary and appellate authorities failed to consider the petitioner’s defence, relevant documents, and the effect of his acquittal in the criminal case.

Whether the authorities travelled beyond the charges framed against the petitioner while sustaining the disciplinary action.

Whether dismissal from service was disproportionate to the misconduct alleged and proved against the petitioner.

The Court applied the principles of natural justice and reasonable opportunity in departmental proceedings, including the delinquent employee’s right to inspect relevant material, cross-examine prosecution witnesses, and produce defence evidence.

It relied on Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727, and Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991) 1 SCC 588, concerning the right to receive and represent against an enquiry report.

Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570, holding that disciplinary findings must be based on legally acceptable evidence and supported by reasons.

State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772, and M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India, AIR 2006 SC 3475, on disclosure of documents, consideration of relevant evidence, and the prohibition against deciding allegations beyond the charges.

The Court further relied on Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 178, for the principle that unauthorised absence constitutes misconduct only when the absence is wilful.

On proportionality, it relied on Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372, and Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 INSC 639, holding that dismissal, being the severest penalty, must be reserved for grave misconduct and imposed only after considering relevant mitigating circumstances.

The Court found that the petitioner had specifically requested permission to produce defence witnesses and had relied on medical documents to explain his absence, but the Enquiry Officer did not provide an effective opportunity to adduce that evidence.

The petitioner also asserted that he was asked to cross-examine prosecution witnesses without being supplied their statements, which impaired his ability to conduct an effective defence.

The Court accepted that the revolver and cartridges had already been seized by the Saran police, making the charge of non-deposit difficult to sustain.

It also noted that the allegation of fighting while intoxicated had resulted in a criminal prosecution in which the petitioner was acquitted.

The disciplinary and appellate orders were found not to have adequately addressed the petitioner’s defence or the evidentiary deficiencies.

Further, the authorities had treated matters connected with unauthorised absence without properly determining whether the absence was wilful, as required by Krushnakant B. Parmar.

Finally, the Court held that the authorities had imposed the extreme penalty of dismissal without assessing whether the misconduct involved corruption, moral turpitude, financial loss, or other circumstances warranting dismissal; the penalty was therefore disproportionate.

The Court set aside the dismissal order dated 12 July 2001, the appellate order dated 29 October 2002, the memorial order dated 20 February 2003, and the review order dated 18 November 2013.

The matter was remitted to the disciplinary authority to recommence the proceedings from the defective stage, after granting the petitioner an effective opportunity to participate, produce defence evidence, and otherwise defend himself.

The petitioner was directed to be reinstated forthwith, while salary and other consequential benefits for the intervening period were left to be determined in light of the fresh proceedings.

The authorities were permitted to place him under suspension after reinstatement, subject to payment of suspension allowance, and were directed to complete the fresh exercise within six months.