### Dispensation of Inquiry Under Article 311(2)(b) Requires Objective Evidence of Impracticability, Not Mere Allegational Gravity

The petitioners, an Inspector and two Constables in the Himachal Pradesh Police, were dismissed from service via common orders dated 12.01.2026 by the Director General of Police (DGP).

The dismissals were triggered by FIRs registered against them under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985.

In the case of Neeraj Kumar, a prior departmental inquiry on separate charges had already resulted in a minor penalty.

The DGP invoked Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India and Sections 63 and 87 of the H.P. Police Act, 2007, to dispense with the mandatory departmental inquiry, citing the gravity of the drug menace and the potential for the petitioners to intimidate witnesses or compromise investigations.

The petitioners challenged these orders as a violation of the principles of natural justice and the constitutional mandate.

The court applied Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India, which permits dispensing with an inquiry if the authority records in writing that it is "not reasonably practicable" to hold one.

The court relied on the landmark precedent of Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel (1985), which establishes that "not reasonably practicable" means a situation where a reasonable man would find the inquiry unfeasible due to threats to witnesses or an atmosphere of violence.

It further applied principles from Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police (2025), emphasizing that the power to dispense with an inquiry must be used sparingly and cannot be based on the mere gravity of the offense or a desire to avoid a weak case.

Rules 16.1 and 16.24 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (as applicable to H.P.), and Sections 63 and 87 of the H.P. Police Act, 2007, were also considered regarding disciplinary powers.

The Court first clarified that the DGP, being an officer of higher rank than those specified in Rule 16.1 of the Punjab Police Rules, possessed the jurisdiction to pass dismissal orders.

On the constitutional validity of dispensing with the inquiry, the Court found the DGP’s orders to be flawed; upon perusing the record, the Court noted there was no independent preliminary inquiry or material to substantiate claims of witness intimidation.

The eleven reasons cited by the DGP in all three cases were found to be verbatim "cyclostyle" justifications based on hypothetical "proximate apprehensions" rather than concrete evidence.

The Court observed that the gravity of the NDPS charges alone does not satisfy the "not reasonably practicable" test under Article 311(2)(b); the exception requires an objective impossibility or high risk in holding the proceeding itself.

The Court concluded the DGP used the constitutional exception as a "mean" to achieve a pre-decided "end," thereby violating the safeguards against arbitrary dismissal.

The Court allowed the writ petitions and quashed the dismissal orders dated 12.01.2026; the respondents were directed to ensure consequential benefits ensue, but the Court explicitly reserved the right of the State to initiate fresh departmental proceedings against the petitioners in accordance with the due process of law.