Disputed demolition damages must be pursued in civil court, not through constitutional-tort writ jurisdiction.

The original petitioner claimed ownership of 2 Kathas 7 Lechas of land covered by Patta Nos. 53 and 97 and Dag Nos. 1049 and 1636 at Lanka, Hojai, and alleged that government and local authorities, accompanied by armed police, demolished a portion of his two-storey RCC building on 19 February 2017.

After his death, his legal heirs were substituted as petitioners.

The Deputy Commissioner disputed the petitioner’s claimed extent of ownership, asserting that he owned only 2 Kathas 2 Lechas and that part of the building stood on Government Dag No. 1038, reserved as “Gobat” land.

The authorities stated that eviction proceedings had been initiated under the Settlement Rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886, and denied demolishing any portion of the building situated on the petitioner’s own land.

Despite opportunities, the petitioners filed no reply to the affidavits-in-opposition.

1. Whether the respondents’ action in conducting the eviction and allegedly demolishing part of the petitioner’s building constituted a constitutional tort warranting compensation under writ jurisdiction.

2. Whether the claim for compensation and damages survived in favour of the legal heirs after the original petitioner’s death.

3. Whether the alleged damage to the building and the extent of loss could be determined in a writ petition, or required adjudication by a competent civil court.

The Court applied the constitutional-tort principle that monetary compensation in writ jurisdiction may be awarded for a clear violation of constitutional rights by State authorities, but such relief is inappropriate where the alleged illegality, ownership, encroachment, damage, and quantum of loss involve seriously disputed questions of fact.

It also relied on the legal principle that eviction from Government land may be undertaken under the Settlement Rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886.

Further, the Court held that the original petitioner’s claim for compensation for injury to his life and property was personal and that the asserted right to sue did not survive his death in the circumstances of the case.

The Court found that the petitioner’s assertion of ownership over 2 Kathas 7 Lechas was specifically disputed, with the respondents asserting ownership over only 2 Kathas 2 Lechas and encroachment by the building upon Government Dag No. 1038.

Since this material assertion remained effectively unrebutted, the Court held that it could not conclude that the authorities had violated the petitioner’s constitutional rights by conducting the eviction.

The Court further noted that whether any portion of the building was damaged, the extent of such damage, and the amount of compensation required factual investigation and proof, which could properly be undertaken only in a civil suit and not in writ proceedings.

The alleged personal claim for constitutional compensation was also held not to survive in favour of the substituted petitioners after the original petitioner’s death.

However, the dismissal was declared not to preclude the petitioners from approaching a competent civil court for compensation for any loss caused by demolition of the portion of the building standing on the petitioners’ own land.

If such a civil suit is instituted, the period from 28 February 2017 until the date of institution is to be excluded while computing limitation.