Disputed vacancies pending litigation cannot be merged with future recruitment cycles or treated as lapsed.

In brief

The question

1. Whether the State Appellate Authority was legally justified in cancelling appointments by treating 2008 vacancies as lapsed, despite pending litigation since 2010?

The court held

The Court held that a candidate cannot be penalized for administrative delays or the long pendency of quasi-judicial proceedings.

It also directed

The Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the State Appellate Authority’s order dated 25.04.2025/17.04.2025, as well as the consequential termination orders (Memo No. 1325 and Memo No. 458). The respondent authorities were directed to forthwith restore the petitioners to their respective posts with full continuity of service and payment of all arrears and current salary.

01Facts

The 27 petitioners applied for Prakhand Teacher posts in Bathnaha Block, Sitamarhi, under the 2008 Recruitment Rules. Although they participated in counseling on 12.08.2010, administrative disputes between local officials disrupted the process, and they were denied appointment letters.

p. 5

The petitioners immediately filed appeals before the District Teacher Employment Appellate Authority in 2010.

p. 6

After protracted litigation and a long vacancy in the office of the Presiding Officer, the District Authority finally directed their appointment on 20.06.2024, holding they were illegally deprived of jobs despite being eligible.

p. 9

Petitioners joined service and underwent training.

p. 10

However, the State Appellate Authority, on an appeal by the District Programme Officer, set aside these appointments on 25.04.2025, ruling that the 2008 vacancies had lapsed or merged into subsequent phases.

pp. 3-4, 33

The petitioners challenged this cancellation and the consequential termination orders.

pp. 19-21

02Issues

i.1. Whether the State Appellate Authority was legally justified in cancelling appointments by treating 2008 vacancies as lapsed, despite pending litigation since 2010?

¶ 30

ii.2. Whether the termination of the petitioners’ services without a formal departmental inquiry or adherence to natural justice was valid under the Bihar Primary Teacher Appointment Rules?

¶ 30

iii.3. Whether candidates who pursued remedies since 2010 can be denied the benefit of a judicial order on the ground of administrative delay or merger of vacancies?

¶ 30

03Law Applied

The court applied the Bihar Elementary Teachers Appointment Rules, 2008 and the Bihar Primary Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012 (Rule 15-Chha) regarding the procedure for termination.

p. 42

It relied on Memo No. 1475 (04.12.2010) and Memo No. 998 (03.10.2017) which clarify that disputed cases pending before Appellate Authorities remain exempt from the "cut-off" for selection phases.

pp. 32-33

It applied the precedent from Upendra Kumar v. State of Bihar (CWJC 19754/2021), establishing that appointments made under judicial orders cannot be termed "fraudulent" or "illegal" based on presumptions of lapsed vacancies.

p. 35

It further referenced Kamal Nayan Mishra v. State of M.P. regarding the necessity of a hearing before termination from a civil post.

p. 43

Provisions in the judgment · 2

Bihar State Election Commissioner (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2008 ---

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ---

04Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the petitioners were not raising "stale claims" but had been in continuous litigation since the inception of the dispute in 2010.

p. 33

It found that the State Appellate Authority ignored departmental circulars (specifically Memo No. 998) which protect "disputed vacancies" from being merged into future recruitment cycles while litigation is pending.

p. 33, 49

The Court noted that the State Authority’s decision was based on a "mechanically applied" assumption of lapsed vacancies rather than the specific facts of the 2010 counseling irregularities.

p. 17

Furthermore, the Court held the termination orders (Memo 1325 and 458) were issued in "undue haste" and violated Principle of Natural Justice, as the petitioners held civil posts and were removed without an independent inquiry or a finding of fraud.

pp. 45-46

The Court also noted the State Authority’s order was potentially coram non-judice as it was passed by a single member in violation of quorum rules under the 2015 Regulations.

p. 38