Disputes over land classification and compensation under Section 3G are referable to arbitration.

The petitioners challenged an award dated 29 February 2016 passed by the competent authority under Section 3G of the National Highways Act, 1956, contending that compensation had been calculated by treating the acquired property as agricultural land, whereas it was allegedly non-agricultural land.

The petitioners also challenged communications dated 25 April 2025 and 28 August 2025 rejecting their requests for modification, correction or amendment of the award.

They alleged that the award was passed ex parte without granting them an opportunity of hearing and that their subsequent applications were also rejected without hearing.

The petitioners had not invoked Section 3G(5) of the Act seeking redetermination of compensation by an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government.

Whether the writ petition under Article 226 was maintainable to challenge the award under Section 3G(1) on the ground of violation of natural justice?

Whether the petitioners’ grievance regarding classification of the land as agricultural and the resulting computation of compensation could be raised under Section 3G(5) before the statutory arbitrator?

Whether the disputed questions concerning the nature of the land and the amount of compensation could be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction?

Section 3G(3) and (4) of the National Highways Act, 1956 require the competent authority to publish a public notice in two local newspapers, including one vernacular newspaper, inviting claims from all persons interested in the land and providing them an opportunity to appear personally, through an agent or through a legal practitioner.

Under Section 3G(5), where the compensation determined under Section 3G(1) or (2) is unacceptable to either party, the amount may be redetermined by an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government.

The provision extends to all disputes relating to the determination of compensation, including disputes concerning the nature or classification of the acquired property and the applicable valuation.

Article 226 jurisdiction is not ordinarily appropriate for adjudicating disputed questions of fact concerning the nature of land and the amount of compensation.

The Court held that the petitioners had not pleaded that the statutory public notice under Section 3G(3) was not issued, nor had they disclosed any claims filed or participation in the proceedings before the award was made.

Consequently, the plea that the award was passed in breach of natural justice could not, by itself, sustain the writ petition, since the statutory scheme afforded interested persons an opportunity to submit claims and appear before the competent authority.

The Court further rejected the petitioners’ interpretation that Section 3G(5) was confined only to claims for enhancement of compensation.

It held that the provision covered every dispute concerning the compensation determined under Section 3G(1) or (2), including whether the land was agricultural or non-agricultural and whether the correct jantri value had been applied.

These factual and valuation disputes were therefore required to be raised before the statutory arbitrator and could not be effectively determined in proceedings under Article 226.

It held that the challenge to the award and the subsequent rejection communications was misconceived because the petitioners had an available statutory remedy under Section 3G(5), and the disputed questions regarding land classification and compensation were unsuitable for determination in writ jurisdiction.

Accordingly, none of the prayers was granted; the petition was disposed of as misconceived, with no order as to costs.