Down Syndrome constitutes an intellectual disability falling within the scope of "mental retardation" under the National Trust Act.

The petitioner, father of the 3rd respondent (aged 19), sought legal guardianship of his daughter, who has Down Syndrome and a certified intellectual disability of 55%

The 4th respondent (mother) left the matrimonial home with the daughter in December 2024

The petitioner filed an application (Ext.P8) before the 1st respondent (District Collector) under the National Trust Act, 1999, to be appointed as her legal guardian

The 1st respondent summarily rejected the application via Ext.P9, stating that Down Syndrome does not fall within the categories of disability recognized under the Act

Respondents 3 and 4 opposed the writ, alleging matrimonial cruelty and asserting the daughter’s right to choose her residence

1. Whether the 1st respondent was justified in rejecting the guardianship application on the ground that Down Syndrome is not a disability falling within the purview of the National Trust Act, 1999?

The court applied Section 2(g) of the National Trust Act, 1999, which defines "mental retardation" as arrested or incomplete development of the mind characterized by sub-normality of intelligence

It referenced Section 2(j), defining "person with disability" to include those with autism, cerebral palsy, or mental retardation

The court also relied on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 Guidelines (S.O. 76(E)), which recognize intellectual disability

Section 14 of the National Trust Act, which mandates the Local Level Committee to process guardianship applications through a specific statutory procedure involving assessment and inquiries

The court found the 1st respondent’s conclusion—that Down Syndrome is excluded from the Act—to be legally and factually erroneous. Citing medical literature and the IAP Handbook, the court noted that Down Syndrome is the most common genetic cause of intellectual disability, thereby falling squarely under the definition of "mental retardation" in Section 2(g)

Furthermore, the court observed that the 1st respondent failed to follow the mandatory procedural requirements under Section 14 of the Act and Regulations 11-13 of the Board of the Trust Regulations, 2001

No hearing was afforded to the parties, and no assessment of the disabled person’s needs was conducted. Consequently, the summary rejection was deemed arbitrary and vitiated by non-application of mind

The 1st respondent/competent authority was directed to reconsider the petitioner's application (Ext.P8) on its merits, affording all parties an opportunity to be heard and adhering to the statutory procedure, within a period of three months