Dowry-death presumption arises only after the prosecution proves dowry-related cruelty soon before death.

Misha Devi died after suffering extensive burn injuries in October 2020, within three years of her marriage to Raushan Kumar Yadav.

Her alleged fardbeyan accused her husband and in-laws of assaulting her and setting her on fire over a demand for a motorcycle.

The trial court acquitted the father-in-law and mother-in-law of the charges, including under Section 304B IPC, but convicted Raushan under Section 304B IPC and sentenced him to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment.

The deceased’s father appealed against the acquittals; Raushan appealed against his conviction.

1. Whether the deceased’s fardbeyan could safely be relied on as a dying declaration when its recording, authenticity, and the deceased’s fitness to make it were not established.

2. Whether the prosecution proved the foundational requirements for the presumption of dowry death—dowry-related cruelty or harassment “soon before” death—so as to shift the burden to the accused.

3. Whether the acquittals were liable to be disturbed, and whether the conviction of Raushan under Section 304B IPC could stand on the evidence.

Section 304B IPC requires the prosecution to establish, among other elements, that the woman’s death occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of marriage and that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with a dowry demand.

Under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (identified in the judgment as now corresponding to Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam), the presumption of dowry death arises only after the prosecution establishes the necessary foundational facts; the reverse burden does not arise before then.

Under Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, a dying declaration need not invariably be recorded by a Magistrate or certified by a doctor, but the court must be satisfied that the declarant was fit to make it and that it is voluntary and truthful.

Meharaj Singh v. State of U.P. identifies unexplained delay in transmission of an FIR to the Magistrate as a relevant check on its authenticity.

On an appeal against acquittal, H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka requires the appellate court to respect a reasonable view taken by the trial court; acquittal may be reversed only where the evidence permits no other conclusion than guilt.

The fardbeyan was not proved by its purported recorder, no evidence established the deceased’s fitness to make it, and a doctor’s initial dated 5 October 2020 on the document undermined the claimed chronology.

The delay in registering the case and transmitting the FIR to the Magistrate further damaged the prosecution’s case.

The witnesses did not provide cogent evidence of a dowry demand or of cruelty for such a demand soon before the death; the alleged motorcycle demand was largely based on what the deceased had reportedly told relatives, and the claimed village panchayats were not reliably established.

Accordingly, the Section 113B presumption was not triggered.

The fardbeyan had not been put to Raushan in his Section 313 CrPC examination.

The trial court’s view was a possible one and was not shown to be perverse.

It allowed Raushan Kumar Yadav’s appeal, set aside his Section 304B IPC conviction, and acquitted him on benefit of doubt; it directed his release forthwith unless required in another case.