Economic Blockade and Stone Pelting During Protests Do Not Constitute "Terrorist Acts" Under UAPA Without Proof of Specified Lethal Means.

The NIA appealed an order dated 22.06.2021 by the Special Judge, NIA, which discharged the four respondents of offences under Sections 120B, 143, 147, 148, 149, 326, 307, 333, 353, and 427 of the IPC, and Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA).

The case arose from safe-city protests against the Citizenship Amendment Bill (CAB) on 09.12.2019 at Chabua, where a mob allegedly led by Akhil Gogoi (A-1) engaged in stone-pelting, causing grievous injury to a police officer, and damaged a government vehicle.

The Special Judge had discharged the accused on the grounds that the evidence, including speeches and telephonic transcripts, did not prima facie instigate violence or constitute a "terrorist act".

1. Whether the Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction by conducting a "mini-trial" to assess the reliability of witnesses at the stage of framing charges.

2. Whether the acts of the respondents—specifically stone-pelting and rail blockades—constitute a "terrorist act" under Section 15 of the UAPA.

3. Whether there were sufficient materials to presume the commission of offences under the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

the court applied the principles of discharge and charge-framing under Sections 227 and 228 of the CrPC, relying on Union of India v. Prafulla Kr. Samal, which establishes that while a judge can sift evidence to find a prima facie case, they cannot conduct a "roving enquiry" or a mini-trial.

Regarding the UAPA, the court applied the "intent, means, and object" test from Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra and Vernon v. State of Maharashtra, emphasizing that stringent laws require strict interpretation.

The principle of ejusdem generis was applied to Section 15(1)(a) of the UAPA to determine if "stones" qualify as "other means" of a hazardous nature.

The High Court found that the Trial Court erred in its IPC analysis by testing the veracity and reliability of the witnesses (PW-2, PW-5, etc.) instead of taking their statements at face value.

The High Court held that at the charging stage, the continued presence of the respondents after the assembly became violent prima facie attracts vicarious liability under Section 149 IPC.

the Court concurred with the Trial Court. It reasoned that the speeches of A-1 were political dissent and lacked instigation to violence.

Crucially, the Court held that "stones" do not fall under the hazardous means (like explosives or biological substances) listed in Section 15(1)(a) of the UAPA when interpreted via ejusdem generis.

Furthermore, symbolic "Rail Roko" protests without the use of lethal means do not constitute an attack on India's economic security under the UAPA.

It set aside the discharge regarding the IPC offences, finding sufficient prima facie material to proceed with charges under Sections 120B, 143, 147, 148, 149, 326, 307, 333, 353, and 427 of the IPC. As the NIA Special Court lacks jurisdiction over standalone IPC offences in this context, the Court ordered the transfer of the case to a regular jurisdictional court under Section 20 of the NIA Act.