Election Petition Lacking Material Facts on How Alleged Corrupt Practices Affected Results Is Liable for Rejection

The Petitioner (Khan), the runner-up in the 2024 Maharashtra Legislative Assembly elections for the Chandivali Constituency, challenged the victory of Respondent No. 1 (Lande).

The challenge was based on three grounds: (A) a "road show" and campaign by star campaigner Eknath Shinde during the 48-hour "silent period" in violation of Section 126 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 ("the Act").

(B) Lande's Form 26 Affidavit allegedly contained misleading disclosures by including excessive civil cases to dilute the impact of criminal cases and suppressed residential asset details.

And (C) apprehensions of EVM tampering.

Lande filed a Rejection Application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, contending the Petition failed to disclose a cause of action due to a lack of "material facts".

The Court applied Section 83 of the Act, which mandates a concise statement of "material facts".

It relied on Section 123(2) defining "undue influence" as direct or indirect interference with the free exercise of electoral rights.

The Court invoked Section 100(1)(b) (corrupt practice by candidate/agent) and Section 100(1)(d)(iv) (non-compliance with the Act/Rules where the result is "materially affected").

Precedents included *Kanimozhi Karunanidhi v. A. Santhana Kumar*, establishing that omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action.

*Mangani Lal Mandal v. Bishnu Deo Bhandari*, holding that for Section 100(1)(d)(iv), the petitioner must specifically plead how the violation "materially affected" the result.

And *Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar* on the parameters of "undue influence".

The Court found the Petition deficient in "material facts" across all grounds.

Regarding the road show, while it may have violated Section 126 (carrying criminal sanctions), the Petitioner failed to plead how this constituted "undue influence" under Section 123(2)—specifically, how it interfered with the free volition of voters via threats or inducements rather than mere "influence".

For the claim under Section 100(1)(d)(iv), the Court noted the absence of any factual basis (beyond a bald assertion) showing that the campaign or the Form 26 defects actually changed the outcome of the election (the "materially affected" standard).

Regarding the Form 26 Affidavit, the Court held that disclosing more information than the minimum (civil cases) is not a corrupt practice and the alleged suppression of an occupied residence lacked a plea of ownership.

The EVM challenge was deemed a generic apprehension lacking specific linkage to any corrupt act.

It held that the Petition failed to disclose a cause of action under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC because it lacked material facts to support charges of "corrupt practice" or to demonstrate that the election result was "materially affected" by non-compliance.

The Court clarified that this dismissal does not prejudice separate criminal proceedings for the alleged Section 126 violation or the administrative random check of EVMs.

Case dismissed; no costs.