Electricity suppliers bear strict liability for electrocution deaths, irrespective of negligence, absent recognised exceptions.

On 28 June 2007, Maheshbhai was walking towards work when a live electric wire allegedly snapped from an electric pole and fell on him, causing electrocution and serious injuries, resulting in his death.

His legal heirs instituted Special Civil Suit No. 64 of 2008 against Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Limited (PGVCL), claiming ₹10,00,000 as compensation on the basis of the company’s negligence.

PGVCL denied liability and contended that the deceased’s own negligence caused the incident.

The trial court held that the death was caused by electrocution, partly decreed the suit, and awarded ₹2,86,800 with interest at 9% per annum from the date of filing until realization.

PGVCL challenged the decree under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Whether the deceased died as a result of electrocution caused by the snapping and falling of PGVCL’s live electric wire, notwithstanding the post-mortem reference to a head injury.

Whether PGVCL could avoid liability by alleging negligence or carelessness on the part of the deceased.

Whether the trial court’s award of ₹2,86,800 with interest required interference in appeal.

The Court applied the principle of strict liability applicable to inherently dangerous activities, including the transmission and supply of electricity.

It relied on Rylands v. Fletcher, which imposes liability for damage caused by the escape of a dangerous thing; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, which developed the doctrine of absolute liability for hazardous activities; H.S.E.B. v. Ram Nath, which held electricity suppliers responsible for injuries caused by dangerous electric lines; and M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, which recognised the primary liability of electricity authorities when live wires cause injury or death, irrespective of negligence.

The Court also relied on P.G.V.C.L. v. Heirs of Chandrikaben Harpalsinh, holding that installation, maintenance and safety of electrical lines are the supplier’s responsibility.

Following Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. v. Rekha, 2026 INSC 847, the Court held that strict liability, rather than absolute liability, applies to electricity authorities, subject to recognised exceptions such as consent, act of a stranger, act of God, statutory authority, plaintiff’s default, and remoteness of consequences.

The appeal was maintainable under Section 96 CPC.

The post-mortem report recorded multiple electrical marks and burns on the deceased’s forearms, flank and hand, including blackening, reddening, eroded skin and parchment-like floors.

The charge-sheet also stated that the live wire fell on the deceased’s head while he was walking on the road, causing both head injuries and electrocution.

The Court therefore rejected PGVCL’s attempt to distinguish between death by head injury and death by electrocution, holding that the evidence established electrocution as a substantial cause of death and applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur.

Since PGVCL was engaged in the inherently hazardous activity of supplying electricity, it had a continuing duty to maintain the wires, prevent their exposure, and ensure that a snapped live wire did not remain energised on a public road.

The allegation of contributory or sole negligence by the deceased could not defeat liability because PGVCL neither established any recognised exception to strict liability nor demonstrated that the case fell outside the foreseeable risks of electrical transmission.

The Court further observed that the trial court’s award was already modest for the death of a 40-year-old person.

The defence based on the deceased’s alleged negligence was rejected in the absence of proof of any applicable exception to strict liability.

The First Appeal was dismissed, and the trial court’s decree awarding ₹2,86,800 with interest at 9% per annum from the date of filing of the suit until realization was affirmed.

Any amount deposited with the trial court was directed to be disbursed to the plaintiffs along with accrued interest; pending civil applications, if any, were disposed of, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the concerned court.