Electricity-theft acquittal upheld where Section 151 authorization and seized apparatus were unproved.

On 10 June 2008, officers of the Jamjodhpur (East) Sub-Division inspected the respondent’s alleged puncture shop at Village Sadodar, Jamjodhpur, and alleged that he was bypassing the electricity meter through a cable and other apparatus, thereby dishonestly abstracting electricity.

A supplementary bill of ₹37,081.77 was prepared and the alleged apparatus was stated to have been seized. The respondent did not pay the bill, and an FIR was registered on 7 July 2009 for an offence under Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

Following investigation, a charge-sheet was filed and the matter was committed to the Special Court, Khambhalia, as Special (G.E.B.) Case No. 1 of 2011. The trial court acquitted the respondent on 26 July 2012.

The State challenged the acquittal under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The High Court noted that the alleged seized cable and other apparatus were not produced before the Investigating Officer or the trial court, that the prosecution did not establish the respondent’s ownership or occupation of the premises, and that a material witness’s statement was recorded nearly two years after the inspection.

1. Whether the trial court was justified in acquitting the respondent of the offence under Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

2. Whether the trial court properly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence led by the prosecution.

3. Whether the impugned acquittal suffered from any illegality, irregularity, perversity, or other infirmity warranting appellate interference.

4. Whether the prosecution was legally maintainable in the absence of proof of the authorization contemplated by Section 151 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

The court applied Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003, which criminalizes dishonest abstraction, consumption, or use of electricity through unauthorized connections, tampered meters, or artificial means; where an artificial or unauthorized means exists, dishonesty may be presumed against the consumer until rebutted.

Section 151 restricts cognizance of offences under the Act to complaints by the Appropriate Government, authorized officers, specified electrical inspectors, licensees, generating companies, or, under its proviso, a police report under Section 173 CrPC.

The court relied on State of Gujarat v. Mohamad Nathabhai Sumara, Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 2009, concerning compliance with Section 151.

In appeals against acquittal, the principles in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471; Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149; and Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169, establish that although an appellate court may fully reappreciate the evidence, the accused benefits from a reinforced double presumption of innocence, and an acquittal should not be disturbed where two reasonable views are possible.

The High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the essential circumstances connecting the respondent with electricity theft.

Although the inspection team alleged that an unauthorized cable and apparatus had been used, the alleged muddamal was never produced or proved, creating a serious evidentiary lacuna.

The prosecution also failed to establish that the respondent owned or occupied the inspected premises, weakening the statutory presumption under Section 135.

The unexplained delay between the inspection, registration of the FIR, and recording of the checking witness’s statement further impaired the reliability of the prosecution case.

Additionally, following Mohamad Nathabhai Sumara, the court accepted the trial court’s finding that the prosecution had not established the authorization required under Section 151, rendering the prosecution unsustainable in law.

Applying the restrictive principles governing appellate interference with acquittals, the High Court found that the trial court’s view was reasonable and neither perverse nor manifestly illegal.

The State’s appeal was dismissed, the judgment and order of acquittal dated 26 July 2012 were confirmed, the respondent’s bail bond was cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the trial court.