Employment secured through forged educational documents remains void ab initio despite prolonged service.

The applicant, appointed as a Ward Boy in 1990, was served with a major-penalty charge sheet under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, alleging that he had submitted a forged mark sheet at the time of his appointment.

He denied the charge and participated in the departmental inquiry. The Inquiry Officer found the charge proved, following which the Disciplinary Authority dismissed him from service on 15 July 2020. His departmental appeal was rejected on 2 March 2021.

Before the Tribunal, the applicant contended that the inquiry had been conducted behind his back, that no school witness had been examined, that his original documents had been verified at the time of appointment, and that initiation of proceedings after approximately 29 years of service and shortly before his retirement was unlawful.

The respondents maintained that the applicant had received full procedural opportunity and that the documentary evidence established submission of a forged mark sheet.

Whether the departmental inquiry and the orders of dismissal and appellate rejection were vitiated by breach of natural justice or procedural irregularity.

Whether initiation of disciplinary proceedings in 2019, approximately 29 years after the alleged submission of the forged mark sheet and shortly before the applicant’s retirement, was legally impermissible.

Whether the penalty of dismissal from service warranted interference by the Tribunal on the ground of disproportionality.

The Tribunal applied Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, governing major-penalty disciplinary inquiries.

It reiterated that judicial review in disciplinary matters is limited to examining the legality and fairness of the decision-making process and does not permit re-appreciation of evidence, absent jurisdictional error, procedural irregularity, perversity, or violation of natural justice.

Relying on S.R. Tewari v. Union of India, 2013 (7) SCALE 417, the Tribunal held that interference with punishment is justified only in exceptional cases where the penalty is shocking to the conscience of the court and the court records reasons establishing disproportionality.

Relying on Devender Kumar v. State of Uttaranchal, 2013 (129) AIC 218, it treated furnishing false information to secure employment as an act involving moral turpitude.

Further, relying on Vijay Kishanrao Kurundkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 834, and Ram Saran v. Inspector General of Police, CRPF, judgment dated 2 February 2006, the Tribunal applied the principle that employment obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or forged educational documents is void ab initio, and that long service or proximity to retirement does not confer immunity from consequences of such fraud.

The Tribunal examined the charge sheet, which contained the articles of charge, the statement of imputations, and the list of relied-upon documents, and found that the inquiry had been conducted in accordance with the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.

The inquiry report showed that the listed documents had been produced and examined, and the applicant had been afforded adequate opportunity to participate and defend himself; therefore, his claim that the inquiry was conducted behind his back was rejected.

The Tribunal also found that the Inquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority, and Appellate Authority had considered his defence, written submissions, and other objections.

The delay in initiating proceedings did not invalidate the action because the misconduct concerned alleged fraud at the point of entry into service.

Applying the principle that fraudulent or forged credentials render the appointment void from inception, the Tribunal held that neither the applicant’s long service nor the fact that proceedings were initiated shortly before retirement could legalise the alleged fraudulent appointment.

Since no bias, malice, perversity, violation of natural justice, or procedural defect was established, and the penalty was not shown to be shockingly disproportionate, the Tribunal declined to interfere with the disciplinary findings or punishment.

The challenge to the disciplinary order dated 15 July 2020 and appellate order dated 2 March 2021 was rejected, and Original Application No. 254 of 2021 was dismissed without any order as to costs.