Entry of age in school register without supporting documentation is insufficient to prove minority for conviction under Section 363 IPC.

The State appealed against the judgment dated 19.09.2022 by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Jatara, which acquitted the respondent of charges under Section 363 of the IPC.

The prosecution alleged that on 02.12.2019, the respondent kidnapped the prosecutrix (allegedly aged 15) and took her to Ahmedabad.

The respondent was arrested on 19.01.2022.

The State contended that the Trial Court ignored consistent testimonies of the prosecutrix and her parents and erroneously concluded she was an adult.

1. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age at the time of the incident.

2. Whether the Trial Court’s findings regarding the voluntary nature of the prosecutrix's departure with the accused were perverse or illegal.

The court applied Section 363 of the IPC regarding kidnapping and Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act (as amended in 2015), which prioritizes school/matriculation certificates for age determination, followed by Municipal birth certificates, and finally ossification tests.

It relied on Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana (2013) regarding age determination protocols.

Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act concerning the admissibility of school register entries, provided their source of information is authentic.

The court applied the appellate principle from Mallappa v. State of Karnataka (2024), stating that if two views are possible, the view favorable to the accused must be adopted in an appeal against acquittal.

The court found the prosecution's evidence regarding the prosecutrix's age unreliable. The Headmaster (PW-6) admitted he had no supporting documents for the birth date entered in the school register and could not confirm if it was based on an estimate.

The parents' testimonies (PW-1 and PW-2) were internally inconsistent regarding their marriage date and their daughter’s age, suggesting she could be as old as 27.

Regarding the merits, the prosecutrix’s court testimony contradicted her Section 164 CrPC statement, wherein she admitted following the accused at his request without mention of threat or inducement.

The court noted the improbability of her claims—such as forgetting her way home in a familiar locality—and concluded she likely accompanied the accused voluntarily. Additionally, discrepancies regarding the location and date of recovery made the prosecution's narrative doubtful.

The Court affirmed that the Trial Court's view was legally plausible and, following the precedent in State of Gujarat v. Jayrajbhai Punjabhai Varu, a favorable view for the accused must be maintained in absence of perversity. The judgment of acquittal was upheld and the High Court dismissed the State's application for leave to appeal and the criminal appeal.