Erroneous findings on comparable probationers’ performance require fresh consideration of differential termination.

The appellant was appointed by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (“LIC”) as an Apprentice Development Officer (“ADO”). Under paragraph 2 of the appointment letter, his probation was initially for 12 months, extendable up to 24 months, during which he could be discharged without notice or reasons.

Paragraph 10 required him to secure specified minimum insurance business and recruit and develop a prescribed number of agents during probation.

LIC did not extend his probation and terminated his services on 16 December 2008 on the ground that he had failed to secure the required minimum business.

The appellant challenged the termination in W.P. (C) 2301/2010, contending, inter alia, that other ADOs who had also failed to meet the prescribed targets were continued, whereas he was singled out for adverse treatment.

The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, holding that the appellant had failed to meet the target while 15 other ADOs had achieved the necessary business and were continued.

In the Letters Patent Appeal, the Division Bench found that the chart itself showed that none of the listed ADOs had achieved the target of 550 lives, although several were continued or confirmed.

Whether the learned Single Judge correctly held that the other ADOs whose services were continued had achieved the requisite business target under paragraph 10 of the appointment letter.

Whether the appellant’s contention of differential or discriminatory treatment required reconsideration when other ADOs who had not met the prescribed targets were continued, while his services were terminated.

Whether the judgment dismissing the writ petition should be set aside and the matter remitted for fresh consideration.

The Court applied the contractual terms governing probation and minimum business requirements contained in paragraphs 2 and 10 of the appellant’s appointment letter.

It further applied the principle that an allegation of unequal or discriminatory treatment must be examined by comparing the appellant’s performance and treatment with those of similarly situated employees; a decision based on an erroneous factual premise cannot sustain judicial review.

No statute or judicial precedent was expressly relied upon in the order.

The Court noted that the stated basis for discontinuing the appellant’s services was not merely unsatisfactory performance but failure to bring in the minimum business prescribed in paragraph 10 of the appointment letter.

The chart reproduced in the Single Judge’s judgment showed that none of the ADOs had achieved the stipulated target of 550 policies during the relevant year.

Consequently, the Single Judge’s finding that 15 other ADOs had achieved the requisite business was factually inconsistent with the chart itself.

LIC’s submission that the appellant’s performance was inferior to that of the ADOs whose probation was extended did not cure the need to examine whether employees who likewise failed to meet the formal target were treated differently.

Since the central finding underlying dismissal of the writ petition was erroneous, the appellant’s plea of differential treatment required fresh consideration.

It expressly refrained from deciding the merits of the dispute and left all contentions open to the parties.

The appeal was allowed to that extent, without costs, and the parties were directed to appear before the learned Single Judge on 28 September 2026.