Even non-compoundable forgery and perjury proceedings may be quashed after settlement of a matrimonial dispute.

Petitioner No. 1 had earlier lodged a complaint against respondent No. 2, her husband, alleging offences under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. After investigation, a closure report was prepared. Respondent No. 2 then alleged that the petitioners had initiated that case using forged documents, resulting in registration of the FIR challenged in this petition.

The petitioners sought quashing under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, on the basis of a compromise. The compromise applications were verified by the Principal Registrar, and respondent No. 2 had no objection to quashing.

Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to quash the FIR and consequential proceedings for non-compoundable offences under Sections 467, 471 and 193 of the IPC on the basis of the parties’ compromise.

Whether, in view of the verified compromise and respondent No. 2’s lack of objection, continuation of the criminal proceedings would serve any purpose.

Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023, preserves the High Court’s inherent power to make orders necessary to secure the ends of justice.

Relying on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, the Court reiterated that quashing criminal proceedings on the basis of a settlement is distinct from compounding under Section 320 of the CrPC. The High Court may quash even non-compoundable proceedings where the dispute is appropriately settled, continuation would be futile, and quashing would secure the ends of justice; the nature and circumstances of each case must be considered.

The Court noted that the parties had amicably resolved their dispute, that the compromise had been verified, and that respondent No. 2 did not oppose quashing.

Applying Gian Singh, it concluded that, in these circumstances, continuing the proceedings for the alleged offences under Sections 467, 471 and 193 of the IPC would serve no purpose and that giving effect to the compromise would meet the ends of justice.

The petition was disposed of on the terms of the compromise.