Eviction proceedings against a deceased person are void absent substitution of legal representatives.

Ganesh Chandra Ghosh was the original tenant of Plot No. D-504 at Chetla Station Yard. After his death, his brother Kartick Chandra Ghosh was appointed guardian of Ghosh’s minor children and, with the Port Trust’s authorisation, sub-let 50% of the premises to the petitioner.

Sharmita Ghosh later informed the Port Trust that she had attained majority, sought to have her name recorded as tenant and guardian of her brother, and stated that Kartick had died in 1993.

The Estate Officer nevertheless commenced proceedings against Kartick and ordered eviction in 2007. The petitioner appealed, but the appeal was dismissed. It then challenged that decision under Article 227, arguing that the proceeding had been initiated against a deceased person.

1. Whether an eviction proceeding initiated and concluded against a person who had died before the proceeding was commenced was a nullity.

2. Whether service by affixation and the petitioner’s alleged knowledge of the proceeding could sustain the eviction order despite the notice having been issued to a deceased person.

3. Whether the resulting errors warranted interference under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 requires notice to be issued in proceedings against unauthorised occupants.

Section 13 provides that proceedings concerning arrears of rent, damages, or interest may be taken or continued against the deceased person’s heirs or legal representatives.

Under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, a properly addressed and prepaid letter sent by registered post is deemed served.

A proceeding initiated against a person who was already dead is a nullity; where the relevant statutory provision permits proceedings against heirs or legal representatives, the prescribed procedure must be followed.

The respondents cited Essen Deinki v. Rajiv Kumar and S.R. Tewari v. Union of India on the limits of Article 227, but the Court held that the serious legal error justified supervisory interference.

The Court found that the Port Trust had received Sharmita Ghosh’s registered letter reporting Kartick’s death and seeking recognition of her status, and that service was therefore deemed under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act.

The Estate Officer’s order sheet also recorded that the notice had been returned with the postal endorsement “deceased” and that the petitioner was carrying on business at the premises.

Despite this, the proceeding was pursued against Kartick; reliance on affixation did not address the fundamental defect that the notice was directed to a deceased person. The Estate Officer should instead have followed the procedure for proceeding against heirs or legal representatives, and the failure to do so was a serious infirmity.

The appellate court’s failure to address that defect constituted an error of law warranting interference under Article 227.

It also set aside the appellate judgment and permitted the Port Authorities to initiate fresh proceedings under the Act.

The application was disposed of.