Ex gratia land granted to a deceased employee’s family may be alienated by treating it as a special case.

The petitioners’ father, a Taluka Public Relations Officer, was allegedly killed in communal riots on 17 January 1979 while returning home after performing official duties.

As an ex gratia and humanitarian measure, the Government granted agricultural land measuring Acs.5.00 guntas in Sy.No.44, Anneparthy Village, Nalgonda District, to the petitioners’ mother, including the subject land measuring Acs.2.28 guntas.

The patta certificate stated that the land was heritable but not alienable.

During her lifetime, the petitioners’ mother sought permission/NOC to alienate the land, but her request was rejected by the authorities and ultimately by the Government.

After her death on 27 August 2016, the petitioners succeeded to the property and their names were mutated in the revenue records.

They made further representations seeking an NOC, contending that the grant was a special ex gratia assignment and should be treated in the same manner as assignments to ex-servicemen or freedom fighters under G.O.Ms.No.1117 dated 11 November 1993, which permitted alienation after ten years.

Respondent No.2 rejected the petitioners’ request by Memo dated 26 April 2018, principally on the ground that their mother’s earlier request had already been rejected.

The petitioners challenged that memo and the earlier Government rejection dated 3 February 2010, seeking permission to alienate the subject property on humanitarian and financial grounds, including the medical needs of petitioner No.3, who was unmarried, mentally ill and approximately 62 years old.

Whether the petitioners were entitled to have their request for an NOC considered by treating the land granted to their mother as a special ex gratia assignment, comparable to assignments made to ex-servicemen and freedom fighters under G.O.Ms.No.1117 dated 11 November 1993?

Whether the rejection of the petitioners’ representations solely on the ground that their mother’s earlier request had been rejected was arbitrary, unreasonable and legally unsustainable for failure to consider the petitioners’ specific request and circumstances?

The Court applied the principle that an ex gratia grant made as compensation or financial assistance to the family of a Government employee who died while performing official duty is distinct from an ordinary assignment of Government land to a landless poor person and should not automatically be governed by the latter’s non-alienation restrictions.

It relied on G.O.Ms.No.1117 dated 11 November 1993, under which lands assigned to ex-servicemen and freedom fighters could be alienated after ten years.

The Court further applied the administrative-law requirement that authorities must consider the substance of a representation and provide reasons addressing the grounds specifically raised; an order based solely on an earlier rejection, without examining the changed circumstances and the request for special treatment, is arbitrary and unsustainable.

The Court also invoked humanitarian considerations arising from the compensatory purpose of the grant and the financial and medical circumstances of the family.

The Court found that the land was not allotted to the petitioners’ mother as an ordinary assignment to a landless poor person but as an ex gratia, compensatory measure following the death of the petitioners’ father while on official duty.

Correspondence between the revenue authorities had itself described the grant as a special case and recommended sympathetic consideration of permission to alienate the land.

Since the grant was intended to provide financial support to the bereaved family, the Court held that applying a rigid non-alienation condition was unjustified in the circumstances.

The petitioners’ request was also supported by their financial difficulties and the medical needs of petitioner No.3, facts which were not rebutted by the respondents.

However, respondent No.2 failed to examine whether the case merited treatment under the principles applicable to ex-servicemen and freedom fighters and rejected it merely by referring to the mother’s earlier rejection.

This amounted to an arbitrary and non-speaking consideration of the petitioners’ representation.

It directed respondent No.2 to reconsider the petitioners’ representation for grant of an NOC positively and to pass appropriate orders within four weeks from receipt of the Court’s order.

The Court clarified that its observations were confined to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and would not operate as a precedent.