Exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act is impermissible if prior proceedings failed on merits.

The Petitioner, a transport service provider, entered into a Service Agreement with the Respondent (HCL) on 19.11.2015 to provide employee transport services

The agreement included a "Minimum Running Guarantee" (MG) of 7000 KM per month/cab

Disputes arose regarding unpaid MG dues from September 2015 to December 2018. The Petitioner initially approached the NCLT under the IBC in 2019; however, the NCLAT set aside the NCLT's favor in May 2022

Subsequently, the Petitioner invoked arbitration on 27.07.2022. The Arbitral Tribunal, via an award dated 04.09.2025, dismissed the claims as barred by limitation, as the Petitioner failed to raise monthly invoices within the stipulated time and filed the Section 11 application four years after the last service

1. Whether the Arbitral Tribunal’s decision to reject the claims on the grounds of limitation constitutes a patent illegality or violates the Public Policy of India under Section 34 of the Act

2. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act for the period spent pursuing proceedings before the NCLT and NCLAT

Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which restricts judicial interference to grounds of fraud, corruption, or conflict with "Public Policy" or "Fundamental Policy of Indian Law"

Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3/2020, which provided a 90-day buffer from 01.03.2022 for limitations expiring during the COVID-19 pandemic

Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as interpreted in HPCL Bio-Fuels Ltd. v. Shahaji Bhanudas Bhad, establishing that Section 14(2) applies to applications (like Section 11) only if the prior proceeding failed due to a "defect of jurisdiction" or similar cause, and not on merits

OPG Power Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions to define "patent illegality" and "fundamental policy," emphasizing that mere erroneous application of law is insufficient to set aside an award

The Court found that since the MG payments were due on a monthly basis, the limitation period for each month triggered separately; thus, claims prior to March 2017 had already expired before the COVID-19 extension took effect

Applying the Apex Court’s COVID-19 related limitation directives, the Court noted that even if the limitation expired during the pandemic, the Petitioner was required to invoke arbitration within 90 days of 01.03.2022 (i.e., by 30.05.2022), but only did so on 27.08.2022

the Court upheld the Tribunal's refusal to grant the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act because the NCLAT had dismissed the Petitioner’s prior IBC petition on "merits" rather than a "defect of jurisdiction," which is a mandatory prerequisite for time exclusion

The Court concluded that the Tribunal’s findings were a plausible interpretation of the facts and law, not "shocking the conscience" of the Court or meeting the high threshold of "patent illegality"

The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Arbitral Award did not warrant interference under Section 34 of the Act