Executing courts must determine alleged fraud-induced decree nullity under Section 47 and permit supporting evidence.

The respondent instituted Title Suit No. 22/2020 against the petitioner seeking specific performance of an agreement for sale.

The petitioner’s written statement denied execution of the agreement and alleged that her signatures had been obtained on blank documents; she also pleaded that she was uneducated and not conversant with English.

The suit was decreed on 5 April 2024 on the basis of a joint compromise petition under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”).

During execution proceedings, registered as Title Execution Case No. 3/2025, the petitioner filed an application under Section 47 CPC contending that the compromise decree had been obtained by fraud and was therefore a nullity and inexecutable.

She also sought permission to adduce oral and documentary evidence in support of the alleged fraud.

The Executing Court dismissed both applications, holding that it could not go behind or examine the validity of the compromise decree.

The petitioner challenged that order under Article 227 of the Constitution.

1. Whether an Executing Court can examine, under Section 47 CPC, an objection that a compromise decree is a nullity and inexecutable because it was obtained by playing fraud upon the Court?

2. Whether the judgment-debtor alleging such fraud is entitled to adduce oral and documentary evidence before the Executing Court?

Section 47(1) CPC requires all questions arising between the parties to the suit and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree to be determined by the Executing Court and not by a separate suit.

Although an Executing Court ordinarily cannot go behind the decree or examine its correctness, it may determine whether the decree is void ab initio, a nullity, or was passed without inherent jurisdiction, and consequently inexecutable.

Relying on Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University, (2001) 6 SCC 534, the Court recognised the Executing Court’s power to decide objections concerning the executability of a null and void decree.

It further relied on S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1, for the principle that a judgment or decree obtained by fraud upon the Court is a nullity and non est in law and may be challenged even in collateral proceedings.

The availability of remedies such as an appeal or recourse under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC does not bar an objection under Section 47 CPC concerning the decree’s nullity and executability.

The High Court distinguished between an impermissible challenge to the correctness or validity of a decree and a permissible objection that the decree is a nullity because it was procured by fraud upon the Court.

The petitioner specifically alleged that, being uneducated and unfamiliar with English, she was misled regarding the contents and purpose of the compromise petition and that her signature was obtained through misrepresentation.

If established, such fraud could render the compromise decree non est and inexecutable under the principles stated in Chengalvaraya Naidu.

Therefore, the Executing Court erred in rejecting the Section 47 application as non-maintainable without determining the factual allegation of fraud.

Since the allegation required adjudication, the petitioner had to be afforded an opportunity to lead oral and documentary evidence.

The petitioner was entitled to adduce evidence to establish that allegation.

Accordingly, the impugned order was set aside to the extent it dismissed the petitioner’s Section 47 application and refused permission to adduce evidence.

The matter was remanded to the Executing Court to decide the application afresh after giving both parties an opportunity to lead evidence, and the revision petition was allowed.

The parties were directed to bear their own costs.