Exhaustion of statutory remedies and representation required before challenging administrative orders via writ jurisdiction.

The petitioners, Shailendra Bharati and Sanjeev Kumar Verma, were serving as Group Instructors (Level-7) and were given officiating charges as Vice-Principal/Principal (Level-9).

On 18.12.2025, the Secretary, Labour Resources Department, issued an order (Memo No. 3922) negating the validity of the petitioners' Diploma in Electrical Engineering obtained from IGNOU.

Consequently, their officiating charges were withdrawn, and they were reverted to their original posts.

The petitioners challenged this reversion and the subsequent transfer of their charges to other officers via Notification dated 16.02.2026.

They contended that the impugned order ignored relevant Supreme Court precedents and was passed by an incompetent authority.

1. Whether the order negating the validity of the IGNOU Diploma and the subsequent withdrawal of officiating charges was legally sustainable in light of Supreme Court precedents.

2. Whether the Secretary, Labour Resources Department, lacked the jurisdiction or competence to pass the impugned order.

The court's decision is grounded in the principles of administrative law regarding exhaustion of alternative remedies and the doctrine of jurisdictional competence.

The court acknowledged the petitioners' reliance on various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court (Annexures-P/7 to P/9) regarding the recognition of educational qualifications.

The court applied the procedural principle that an aggrieved semi-government employee should first approach the higher departmental authority—specifically the Principal Secretary—to challenge orders passed by subordinate secretaries on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction or error of law.

The court did not adjudicate the merits of the diploma's validity or the legality of the reversion. Instead, it focused on the procedural gaps in the petitioners' case.

While the petitioners orally claimed to have filed a representation with the Principal Secretary, there was no documentary evidence on record to substantiate this.

The State contended that the order was passed following directions from the High Court.

The Court reasoned that since the petitioners raised a specific plea regarding the Secretary’s lack of competence and the misapplication of Supreme Court precedents, these issues should first be addressed by respondent no. 2 (Principal Secretary).

By granting liberty to file a fresh representation, the court ensured that the administrative hierarchy is utilized to resolve factual and jurisdictional disputes before a final judicial determination is made.

The Court directed the Principal Secretary to pass a reasoned order on the points of jurisdiction and the applicability of the cited Supreme Court judgments within 90 days of receipt.

The petition was disposed of with these directions.