Existence of Alternative Statutory Remedy Precludes Writ Jurisdiction Under Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order

The petitioner, Anju Kumari, filed a writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari to quash a recommendation dated 19-05-2018 issued by the District Selection Committee headed by the District Magistrate (Respondent No. 2).

The recommendation cancelled the petitioner’s selection for a Public Distribution System (PDS) shop based on an objection by one Mamta Singh and instead recommended Respondent No. 3 for the allotment.

The respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, arguing that the petitioner had not exhausted the statutory alternative remedies available under the Bihar Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016.

1. Whether the writ petition is maintainable in light of the alternative statutory remedies provided under the Bihar Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016?

2. Whether the District Magistrate can hear an appeal against an order passed by a committee of which he is the Chairman?

Bihar Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016, specifically Section 32(iii), which provides for an appeal to the District Officer against licensing decisions.

Section 32(v), which allows for stay orders during pendency of appeals; and Section 32(vi), which provides for a revision before the Divisional Commissioner.

Principles of Section 5 of the Limitation Act regarding the condonation of delay for statutory filings.

The principle of natural justice that an authority cannot act as an appellate body over its own decision (nemo debet esse judex in propria causa).

The court observed that while Section 32(iii) designates the District Magistrate as the appellate authority, in this specific instance, the impugned recommendation was made by a committee headed by the District Magistrate himself.

The court reasoned that the District Magistrate could not review or hear an appeal against his own order.

Since the Control Order provides for a revisional remedy under Section 32(vi) before the Divisional Commissioner, the court determined that the petitioner must pursue this alternative statutory route rather than invoking writ jurisdiction.

To ensure the petitioner was not prejudiced by the time spent litigating the writ, the court addressed the lapse in the limitation period by directing the authority to entertain the application under the principles of the Limitation Act.

The petitioner was directed to file a complaint or application before the Divisional Commissioner within one month; the court ordered the concerned authority to condone the delay and dispose of the matter on its merits within three months.