Existence of Civil Remedy No Bar to Criminal Prosecution Where FIR Discloses Cognizable Offenses

The petitioner filed a petition under Section 528 of the BNSS (formerly Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.) seeking to quash FIR No. 561 of 2025.

The complainant (respondent No. 2), the former wife of the petitioner’s cousin, alleged that the petitioner and a co-accused borrowed ₹1 crore between 2018 and 2021.

An MOU was executed in 2021 acknowledging the debt; however, subsequent cheques issued for repayment were dishonored.

The petitioner contended that the dispute was purely civil, motivated by matrimonial malice, and noted that the complainant had already received a ₹5.34 crore settlement in related Supreme Court proceedings.

The State opposed the petition, asserting that the allegations prima facie disclosed criminal breach of trust, cheating, and extortion.

1. Whether the FIR and the allegations contained therein, when taken at face value, disclose the commission of cognizable offences under Sections 420, 406, 384, and 120-B of the IPC.

2. Whether the High Court should exercise its extraordinary inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings involving disputed questions of fact and primarily monetary disputes.

The Court applied the principles governing the quashing of FIRs as established in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, which mandates that power should be exercised sparingly only when no cognizable offence is disclosed.

It further relied on Neharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo, holding that courts must not conduct a mini-trial or resolve disputed questions of fact at the quashing stage.

The Court also recognized the principle that the mere availability of a civil remedy does not bar criminal prosecution if the facts independently satisfy the ingredients of a crime.

The Court examined the FIR and found that the allegations—specifically the obtaining of substantial funds, the execution of an MOU acknowledging liability, and the deliberate issuance of cheques that were subsequently dishonored—sufficiently made out a prima facie case of dishonest intention and criminal breach of trust.

The Court rejected the petitioner’s arguments regarding the complainant’s alleged financial incapacity and the matrimonial background, classifying these as "disputed questions of fact" that must be tested during investigation and trial rather than in a summary proceeding.

The Bench reasoned that since the narrative disclosed the necessary ingredients of cognizable offences, the investigation could not be stifled at the threshold.

The Court held that when an FIR discloses cognizable offences, the High Court cannot usurp the role of the investigating agency or the trial court to weigh the evidence or adjudicate on the merits of factual defenses.

The petitioner was granted liberty to pursue other legal remedies as available.