Exoneration in departmental proceedings does not warrant discharge in criminal trials involving demand and acceptance of bribes.

The petitioner, a Revenue Inspector (R.I.), was accused of demanding a bribe of ₹2,000 to process a land enquiry report for the complainant’s father

It was alleged that the petitioner directed the complainant to his peon (co-accused), who initialy demanded ₹3,000 and later settled for ₹2,000 after consulting with the petitioner

On 05.12.2017, a trap was laid; the co-accused accepted the money and placed it under the table cloth of the petitioner’s desk

While the co-accused’s handwash turned pink, the petitioner’s handwash was not taken as he did not handle the cash

The petitioner sought discharge under Section 239 Cr.P.C., arguing that he never demanded or accepted money, the enquiry report had already been dispatched on 04.12.2017, and he had been exonerated in a departmental proceeding on the same facts

The Trial Court rejected the discharge application on 03.04.2024

1. Whether the findings of a departmental inquiry exonerating the accused on merits create a legal bar against criminal prosecution on identical facts

2. Whether the absence of direct physical handling of bribe money by the accused warrants a discharge at the stage of framing charges

The Court applied Section 397/401 of the Cr.P.C. regarding revisional jurisdiction and Section 7, 12, and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

It relied on the doctrine from Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal, which holds that exoneration in departmental proceedings on merits makes criminal prosecution an abuse of process if the standard of proof is higher in the latter

The Court balanced this against T. Manjunath v. State of Karnataka and The Karnataka Lokayuktha v. Chandrashekar, which clarify that in trap cases, departmental exoneration does not automatically lead to discharge if the acquittal was due to a lack of diligence rather than a finding of innocence on merits

The Court reasoned that at the stage of framing charges, the court must only determine if there is a "strong suspicion" or prima facie evidence, not conduct a mini-trial

Regarding the departmental exoneration, the Court noted that criminal trials involve evidence on oath and a different standard of proof

It distinguished the present case from P.S. Rajya and Radheshyam Kejriwal, observing that the recovery of tainted notes from under the petitioner’s own table cloth—allegedly placed there by a peon acting on his behalf—created a strong suspicion of connivance and awareness

The Court dismissed the petitioner's argument regarding the prior dispatch of the report, noting that the complainant’s lack of knowledge of said dispatch at the time of the bribe payment maintains the proximity of the demand

The discrepancies in the recovery/handwash and the departmental findings were deemed matters for adjudication during the trial, not grounds for discharge

It held that the presence of the bribe money on the petitioner’s desk and the allegations of demand through a subordinate are sufficient to presume the commission of offences under Sections 7, 12, and 13 of the P.C. Act for the purpose of framing charges

The Court affirmed the Trial Court's order dated 03.04.2024, holding that there was no patent error of jurisdiction or manifest injustice requiring interference at this stage