Experience of Subsidiaries Cannot Be Imputed to the Bidding Company to Satisfy Mandatory Eligibility Criteria.

The Petitioner challenged a communication dated 11.01.2026 issued by the Embassy of India, Riyadh, disqualifying it from a tender (RFP) for outsourcing consular, passport, and visa services

The Petitioner was disqualified for failing to meet the "Mandatory Eligibility Criteria" under Chapter V, Para 1(I) of the RFP

The Petitioner contended that the experience of its subsidiary companies should be counted toward its own experience, as the RFP ostensibly treats a bidding company and its subsidiaries as a single competitive unit

This was the third such challenge by the Petitioner, following the dismissal of similar petitions regarding RFPs for Abu Dhabi and London

Whether the experience of a subsidiary company can be treated as the experience of the parent bidding company to satisfy mandatory eligibility criteria under the RFP.

The court applied the principle that a bidding company must satisfy eligibility requirements independently unless the tender document expressly permits the pooling of resources or experience from subsidiaries

It relied on the precedent set in *Rohde and Schwarz GMBH and CO. Kg v. Airport Authority of India*, which established that a subsidiary is a distinct legal entity and its experience does not automatically translate to the parent company

The Court further interpreted the "Mandatory Eligibility Condition" in Chapter V of the RFP, which stipulates that the "Bidding Company must have sound financial credentials of their own without the involvement or help from a third party"

The Court reasoned that Chapter V, Para 1(i) of the RFP explicitly requires the "Bidding Company" to possess the requisite experience and financial credentials "of their own"

While Chapter VI, Clause 1(d) prevents a bidding company and its subsidiaries from bidding separately for the same tender to prevent collusion, the Court held this clause cannot be interpreted to mean their experience is interchangeable

Following the logic in *Rohde and Schwarz*, the Court noted that a bidder cannot claim the experience of a "completely different entity" simply by holding a majority stake, as determining the actual transfer of resources would require an in-depth investigation that the tendering authority is not obligated to perform

Since the facts were identical to the previously dismissed W.P.(C) 2760/2026 and W.P.(C) 1533/2026, the Court found no reason to depart from its earlier view

The Court declined to grant a stay on the tender process despite the Petitioner's mention of interim protection granted by the Supreme Court in related SLPs, maintaining that the current petition lacked merit based on established precedents

All pending applications were disposed of accordingly