Extraordinary Delay of Three Decades Bars Writ Relief for Daily Wager Seeking Re-engagement

The appellant was engaged as a daily wage security guard in the Forest Department from 1988 until his services were terminated in 1995.

The appellant alleged he was promised future re-engagement and cited a 2004 State circular concerning the re-employment of daily wagers.

After learning of other individuals who secured re-engagement through court orders, the appellant filed a representation in late 2025 and subsequently moved the High Court in 2026.

A Single Judge dismissed the underlying writ petition on the grounds of an unexplained thirty-year delay and the availability of alternative remedies under labor laws.

The appellant challenged this dismissal via the present intra-court appeal.

1. Whether the learned Single Judge erred in dismissing the writ petition on the grounds of extraordinary delay and laches.

2. Whether the appellant’s repeated representations to departmental authorities served to create a fresh or recurring cause of action.

3. Whether the appellant was entitled to parity with other re-engaged employees despite the lapse of three decades.

The Court applied the discretionary and equitable nature of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, which precludes relief for litigants who sleep over their rights.

It followed the established doctrine that successive representations do not revive a stale claim or create a recurring cause of action.

The Court noted the principle of alternative efficacious remedies, as labor disputes regarding termination and reinstatement properly fall under industrial adjudication.

The Court emphasized that a justice-oriented approach does not extend to reviving dormant claims that lack a reasonable explanation for inaction.

The Court reasoned that the appellant’s cause of action arose in 1995 upon his disengagement, yet he remained inactive for over thirty years.

The Court rejected the argument that departmental representations preserved his rights, noting that allowing such a premise would undermine the doctrine of finality and render the principles of laches meaningless.

Regarding the plea of parity, the Court found that the appellant could not claim automatic entitlement based on separate proceedings involving other individuals without establishing identical legal and factual circumstances.

The Bench determined that as a daily wager, the appellant should have pursued the specific statutory machinery provided by labor laws within a reasonable timeframe rather than invoking extraordinary writ jurisdiction decades later.

It held that the petition was justly dismissed due to gross, unexplained delay and laches, as well as the failure to utilize alternative statutory remedies.

No order as to costs was made.