Failure of the offending vehicle’s driver to testify justifies adverse inference against his negligence defence.

The respondents-claimants filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, arising from a collision between a Matador and a motorcycle, in which Kishorbhai, the motorcycle rider, suffered fatal injuries.

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Morbi, by judgment dated 2 May 2019 in MACP No. 10 of 2015, awarded ₹24,68,100 with interest at 9% per annum, holding the Matador driver 85% negligent and the deceased motorcycle rider 15% contributorily negligent.

The Insurance Company preferred the present appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, challenging only the apportionment of negligence and contending that both drivers were equally negligent because the accident was a head-on collision.

The claimants filed cross-objections, also confined to the issue of negligence, seeking interference with the Tribunal’s apportionment.

The Tribunal had relied upon the FIR, scene panchnama, charge-sheet, and the fact that the Matador driver had pleaded that the motorcycle was at fault but had not entered the witness box.

Whether the Tribunal erred in finding the Matador driver 85% negligent and the deceased motorcycle rider 15% contributorily negligent in the absence of direct eyewitness evidence?

Whether the Insurance Company established that the deceased was equally negligent and that liability ought to have been apportioned at 50:50 between the two drivers?

Whether the claimants’ cross-objections seeking interference with the Tribunal’s finding on negligence should be allowed?

The Court applied Sections 166 and 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: Section 166 governs claims for compensation arising from motor accidents, while Section 173 provides for an appeal against the Tribunal’s award.

Negligence in motor accident claims is determined on the basis of the preponderance of probabilities, rather than the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Relying on Anita Sharma v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2021) 1 SCC 171, the Court held that where the owner or driver of an offending vehicle pleads that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the other vehicle, the driver, being the best person to explain the occurrence, should enter the witness box; failure to do so may justify an adverse inference under Sections 101, 102 and 114(g) of the Evidence Act, 1872.

The Court also recognised that contributory negligence may be apportioned on the basis of the evidence and circumstances of the accident, including the nature and relative size of the vehicles involved.

The Court found no perversity or legal infirmity in the Tribunal’s assessment.

Although the FIR informant and the claimants were not eyewitnesses, the documentary evidence showed that both vehicles had collided, the motorcycle was severely bent, and the Matador had damage to its bonnet, bumper and driver-side light.

The charge-sheet had been filed against the Matador driver, whereas his assertion that he was driving cautiously on the correct side of the road and that the motorcycle had dashed against the Matador remained unsupported because he did not enter the witness box.

Applying Anita Sharma, the Court treated the driver’s failure to explain the accident through sworn testimony as significant.

At the same time, because the exact road width and precise positions of the vehicles were not established, the Tribunal had appropriately recognised contributory negligence on the part of the deceased.

Considering the Matador’s status as a heavier vehicle and its corresponding duty to maintain a controllable speed, the apportionment of 85% negligence to its driver and 15% to the deceased was held to be a reasonable finding of fact.

The claimants’ cross-objections were also rejected because no ground for disturbing the Tribunal’s apportionment was established.

The Tribunal’s award of ₹24,68,100 with interest at 9% per annum was confirmed.

The Tribunal was directed to release and proportionately disburse the remaining amount lying in fixed deposit to the claimants, subject to verification, within one week of receiving the writ of the judgment.

No order as to costs was made.