Failure to address a material defence with reasons warrants remand in eviction proceedings.

The Petitioner challenged the order dated 17 December 2022 passed by the learned SCJ-cum-ARC, South-East District, Saket Courts, New Delhi, in Eviction Petition No. RC ARC 55/2019, whereby the Petitioner’s application for leave to defend an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was rejected.

The Petitioner’s principal contention was that the Respondent had initiated several earlier proceedings seeking eviction of tenants and that the previous litigations between the parties were relevant to determining whether the Respondent’s requirement of the premises was bona fide.

The learned ARC referred to the documents produced by the Petitioner, including documents relating to earlier litigation, but concluded that they did not disclose any triable issue.

The Petitioner contended that the ARC had failed to provide reasons specifically addressing the relevance and effect of the previous litigations.

1. Whether, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the High Court could interfere where a material defence concerning previous litigations had been noticed but not meaningfully considered by the Rent Controller.

2. Whether the learned ARC’s rejection of the application for leave to defend, without assigning reasons on the alleged relevance of the previous litigations to the Respondent’s bona fide requirement, suffered from a material irregularity in the decision-making process.

3. Whether the matter required remand for fresh consideration of the application for leave to defend.

The Court applied the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, under which the High Court exercises limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction over the Rent Controller’s order and does not function as an appellate court.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30, the Court held that interference is warranted where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, material irregularity, perversity, jurisdictional error, or absence of adjudication.

The Court also relied on Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati, 2024:DHC:9322, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, 2025:DHC:11285, concerning the restricted scope of revisional scrutiny.

Further, applying Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Court reiterated that judicial and quasi-judicial authorities must record reasons while dealing with material contentions; a bare conclusion cannot substitute a reasoned determination.

At the leave-to-defend stage, the tenant must disclose material sufficient to raise a triable issue, but the Rent Controller must still meaningfully adjudicate material defences.

The High Court did not undertake an independent assessment of whether the previous litigations actually disproved the Respondent’s bona fide requirement, since that substantive determination was initially for the learned ARC.

However, the ARC had expressly noticed the documents relied upon by the Petitioner, including the earlier judgment, but merely stated that they did not raise any triable issue.

It did not explain why the previous proceedings were irrelevant or incapable of affecting the Respondent’s plea of bona fide requirement.

Because the contention was material, its rejection required reasons demonstrating application of mind.

The absence of such reasoning prevented effective revisional scrutiny and constituted a material irregularity in the decision-making process under Section 25B(8).

The order dated 17 December 2022 was accordingly set aside, and the matter was remanded to the learned ARC for fresh consideration of the application for leave to defend in accordance with law.

In view of the eviction petition having been instituted in 2019, the ARC was requested to decide the leave-to-defend applications expeditiously, preferably within eight months from the first appearance of the parties.

The parties were directed to appear before the ARC on 24 August 2026, and the revision petition and pending applications were disposed of accordingly.