Failure to adjudicate a material objection vitiates an eviction order and warrants remand.

The Petitioner-tenant challenged the judgment dated 10.02.2026 of the learned Additional Rent Controller, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in RC ARC/735/2023, arising from the Respondent-landlord’s eviction proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

The tenant had specifically objected that the landlord’s plea of bona fide requirement was premature because the landlord had only applied, on 15.05.2023, for a licence from the Town and Country Planning Department, Haryana, to establish a Cyber City, and no licence or permission had allegedly been granted.

The tenant further contended that the impugned judgment did not consider this objection.

The landlord accepted that the objection had not been specifically addressed but argued that the omission did not justify revisional interference and relied on Maganlal s/o Kishanlal Godha v. Nanasaheb s/o Udhaorao Gadewar, (2010) 13 SCC 98.

The landlord also submitted that the tenant could seek restitution under Section 19 of the DRC Act if the asserted bona fide requirement ultimately proved unfounded.

Whether the High Court, while exercising supervisory and revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, could interfere where the learned ARC failed to consider a specific and substantive objection concerning the absence of the requisite licence for the proposed Cyber City.

Whether the landlord’s plea of bona fide requirement was premature or otherwise legally sustainable in the absence of the requisite licence or permission from the competent authority.

The Court applied the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, under which the High Court exercises limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction rather than appellate jurisdiction.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30, the Court held that interference is confined to examining the legality, propriety, and fairness of the decision-making process and is warranted where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, jurisdictional error, material irregularity, perversity, or absence of adjudication.

The Court also relied on Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati, 2024:DHC:9322, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, 2025:DHC:11285, for the limited scope of revisional scrutiny.

Section 19 of the DRC Act was noted as providing a possible remedy of restitution if the landlord’s bona fide requirement was later found to be absent.

The landlord relied on Maganlal s/o Kishanlal Godha, which was cited for the proposition that a landlord need not await uncertain statutory approvals before asserting bona fide requirement.

The Court found that the tenant had raised a specific, substantive, and document-supported objection that the landlord had merely applied for the Cyber City licence and had not obtained the requisite permission.

Although the learned ARC had considered several other objections, the impugned judgment contained no reference to or determination of this particular contention.

The High Court did not decide whether the absence of the licence ultimately defeated the landlord’s bona fide requirement; that question was left for the ARC to determine independently on the material available.

However, because the objection went to the root of the controversy, its complete omission constituted a material infirmity and failure to exercise jurisdiction, thereby vitiating the decision-making process and justifying interference under Section 25B(8).

The judgment dated 10.02.2026 was accordingly set aside, and the matter was restored to the learned ARC for fresh consideration.

The parties were directed to appear before the learned ARC on 11.08.2026, and the revision petition and pending applications were disposed of in those terms.