Failure to adjudicate a material plea warrants revisional interference and remand under Section 25-B(8).

The respondent-landlord instituted an eviction petition under Sections 14(1)(e) and 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”), concerning the premises occupied by Navjiwan Cloth House.

The petitioner-tenant filed a leave-to-defend application challenging the respondent’s claim of bona fide requirement for his son, Vidhur Bajaj.

The tenant specifically pleaded that Vidhur Bajaj was already independently carrying on a timber business from Kirti Nagar, Delhi, and that this undermined the alleged requirement for the tenanted premises; the plea was reiterated in the rejoinder.

By order dated 28 February 2026, the learned ARC rejected the tenant’s challenge, holding, inter alia, that Vidhur Bajaj could not be expected to remain idle and that his employment and business activities had been considered.

The tenant challenged that order under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.

Whether the High Court, while exercising supervisory and revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, could interfere with the ARC’s order where a material plea concerning the landlord’s bona fide requirement had allegedly not been adjudicated?

Whether the ARC’s failure to consider the tenant’s specific plea that Vidhur Bajaj was already carrying on an independent business from Kirti Nagar rendered its order unsustainable and warranted remand?

The Court applied Sections 14(1)(e) and 25-B of the DRC Act governing eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement and the summary procedure for such proceedings, together with the proviso to Section 25-B(8), which confers limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction on the High Court.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30, the Court held that such jurisdiction is not appellate; the High Court must examine the legality, propriety, and decision-making process of the ARC and cannot substitute its own view merely because another view is possible.

The Court also relied on Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati, 2024:DHC:9322, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, 2025:DHC:11285, to reiterate that interference is justified in cases of jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, an unreasonable conclusion, or failure to adjudicate a material plea.

The Court accepted that the tenant’s plea regarding Vidhur Bajaj’s existing independent timber business went to the core of the respondent’s assertion of bona fide requirement.

Although the respondent contended that the ARC had considered Vidhur Bajaj’s employment and business activities, the High Court found that the impugned order did not specifically address the pleaded fact that he was already carrying on business from Kirti Nagar.

This omission constituted a failure to adjudicate a material issue rather than a mere disagreement on the merits.

Accordingly, interference was warranted within the restricted scope of Section 25-B(8), without undertaking a fresh appellate assessment of the evidence or expressing any view on the ultimate merits.

It therefore set aside the order dated 28 February 2026 and remanded the matter to the learned ARC for fresh consideration of the leave-to-defend application after examining all pleadings and material on record.

The Court clarified that it had expressed no opinion on the merits of the parties’ rival contentions.

The ARC was requested to endeavour to decide the leave-to-defend application within six months, and the parties were directed to appear before it on 10 August 2026.

The revision petition and pending applications were disposed of accordingly.