Failure to conclusively establish minority, amid radiological age uncertainty, entitles the accused to acquittal.

The appellant challenged the judgment dated 8 February 2013 by which the Additional Sessions Judge, Unnao convicted him under Section 366 IPC and sentenced him to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹10,000, while acquitting him under Sections 363 and 376 IPC.

The prosecution alleged that on 30 October 2010 the appellant enticed the complainant’s daughter away and took her to Ludhiana.

The prosecutrix’s medical examination indicated pregnancy and assessed her age at approximately 18 years; the radiologist also assessed her age at about 18 years, while allowing a possible variation of six months.

In her statements under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC, the prosecutrix stated that she was in a relationship with the appellant, had voluntarily gone with him, married him, and wished to live with him.

However, during her trial testimony, she alleged that the appellant had made her inhale an unknown substance, causing her to lose consciousness, and had thereafter taken her to Ludhiana.

The trial court relied, inter alia, on an alleged Class VIII marks-sheet and its own assessment of the prosecutrix’s physical characteristics to conclude that she was approximately 17 years old.

1. Whether the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was a minor on the date of the alleged incident, so as to sustain the conviction under Section 366 IPC?

2. Whether the trial court could rely upon the alleged Class VIII marks-sheet produced by the prosecutrix during her examination-in-chief, despite the document not forming part of the trial record or being properly proved?

3. Whether the prosecutrix’s testimony regarding forcible or involuntary taking was sufficiently reliable to sustain the conviction under Section 366 IPC?

Section 366 IPC criminalises kidnapping, abducting, or inducing a woman with the requisite intent, including compelling or inducing her marriage or illicit intercourse; the prosecution must establish the statutory ingredients beyond reasonable doubt.

The court applied the principle that a document sought to be relied upon by the prosecution must be properly produced and proved, and that a prosecutrix cannot introduce an additional document during examination-in-chief without leave of the trial court and without affording the accused an opportunity to object.

The court relied on Bhagyashree Prashant Wasankar v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 1064, concerning the proper production of documents in a Sessions trial, and the requirement that school records be proved by a competent school official.

On age determination, Jaya Mala v. Government of J, (1982) 2 SCC 538, and Jyoti Prakash Rai v. State of Bihar, (2008) 15 SCC 223, establish that radiological age assessment carries a margin of error of approximately two years on either side.

Under Rajak Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 9 SCC 248, reasonable doubt arising from radiological age assessment must benefit the accused.

Finally, under Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21, conviction may rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a prosecutrix only where she is a “sterling witness” whose testimony is consistent, reliable, and free from material contradictions.

The High Court held that the alleged Class VIII marks-sheet could not be relied upon because it was not available in the trial record, had no exhibit number, and was not proved by the issuing school authority; moreover, it had apparently been produced during the prosecutrix’s examination-in-chief without proper procedural leave or opportunity for objection.

The medical experts assessed the prosecutrix’s age at approximately 18 years, and the applicable margin of error meant that she could have been as old as 20 years on the date of the incident. Accordingly, the prosecution failed to prove that she was a minor.

The court further found that her allegation at trial that she had been rendered unconscious was inconsistent with her earlier statements under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC, in which she stated that she had voluntarily accompanied the appellant, married him, and wished to remain with him.

Her prolonged stay with the appellant in Ludhiana without alleging force, together with the absence of a consistent account, meant that her testimony did not meet the “sterling witness” standard.

The trial court therefore erred both in determining minority and in relying on the inconsistent account to establish the ingredients of Section 366 IPC.

The High Court set aside the judgment and order dated 8 February 2013 and acquitted Bhaiya Lal Raidas of the charge under Section 366 IPC, holding that the prosecution had failed to prove either that the prosecutrix was a minor or that she had been forcibly or deceptively taken away.

The appellant was directed to furnish a personal bond and two sureties under Section 437-A CrPC for appearance before the Supreme Court if required.

Any sureties furnished before the judgment were discharged.