Failure to explain delay constitutes sufficient ground to dismiss an appeal as time-barred.

In brief

The question

Whether the appellant had shown sufficient cause for condonation of the 67-day delay in filing the writ appeal?

The court held

The Court rejected I.A. No. 2 of 2025 seeking condonation of the 67-day delay, holding that the appellant had failed to establish sufficient cause.

It also directed

As a consequence, the writ appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation.

01Facts

The Chhattisgarh Board of Secondary Education preferred an intra-Court writ appeal challenging the order dated 22 April 2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPC No. 1958 of 2025, Raman Jaiswal v. Chhattisgarh Board of Secondary Education, whereby the writ petition filed by Raman Jaiswal was disposed of.

¶ 2

The appeal was accompanied by I.A. No. 2 of 2025 seeking condonation of a delay of 67 days in filing the appeal.

¶ 3

The Division Bench found that the Board had not provided a cogent, sufficient, or satisfactory explanation accounting for the entire period of delay.

¶ 4, 7–8

02Issues

i.Whether the appellant had shown sufficient cause for condonation of the 67-day delay in filing the writ appeal?

¶ 3–4, 7–8

ii.Whether, upon rejection of the application for condonation of delay, the writ appeal was liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation?

¶ 9

03Law Applied

The Court applied the settled principle that delay cannot be condoned merely on the basis of a bald assertion; the applicant must disclose a cogent and sufficient cause explaining the delay for the entire period in question.

¶ 4

Relying on Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 652, the Court reiterated that delayed claims are ordinarily rejected on the ground of delay and laches or limitation, subject to limited exceptions such as continuing wrongs, and that relief may nevertheless be denied where reopening the matter would affect settled rights.

¶ 5

The Court also relied on C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining, (2008) 10 SCC 115, for the principle that stale claims cannot be revived by subsequent representations or orders passed pursuant to a direction to consider such representations.

¶ 6

04Reasoning

The Court examined the explanation furnished in I.A. No. 2 of 2025 and found that it did not account for the entire 67-day delay or disclose circumstances constituting sufficient cause.

¶ 4, 7

Since the appellant placed no supporting material warranting a liberal approach, the Court declined to condone the delay.

¶ 7–8

The principles concerning delay and laches required the appellant to provide a satisfactory, fact-based explanation, which it failed to do.

¶ 7–8

Consequently, the appeal could not be examined on merits because it was time-barred.