Facts
The Petitioner challenged, under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”), the order dated 17.12.2022 by which the learned SCJ-cum-ARC, South-East District, Saket Courts, dismissed his application seeking leave to defend in Eviction Petition No. RC ARC 46/2019.
Source reference: p.1, paras. 1–2The Petitioner’s principal contention was that the Respondents had previously initiated several proceedings concerning eviction and that the present petition was part of continuing litigation; according to him, the previous litigations had a material bearing on the Respondents’ claim of bona fide requirement and disclosed a triable issue.
Source reference: p.2, paras. 3–5The Respondents supported the ARC’s order, contending that the previous litigations had been considered in paragraph 29 of the impugned order and that the documents relied upon by the Petitioner did not raise any triable issue.
Source reference: p.2–3, paras. 6–8The High Court found that although the ARC had noticed the documents, it had not explained why the previous litigations were irrelevant or incapable of raising a triable issue.
Source reference: p.6–7, paras. 18–23Issues
Whether the ARC’s failure to provide reasons for rejecting the Petitioner’s specific contention regarding the effect of previous litigations constituted a material irregularity in the decision-making process warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act?
Source reference: p.5–7, paras. 15–24Whether the High Court should itself determine whether the previous litigations affected the Respondents’ plea of bona fide requirement, or remand the matter to the ARC for fresh consideration?
Source reference: p.7, paras. 22–25Law Applied
The Court applied the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, under which the High Court exercises limited supervisory and revisional—not appellate—jurisdiction over the Rent Controller’s decision-making process.
Source reference: p.3–5, paras. 10–16Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30, the Court held that interference is confined to jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, an erroneous legal premise, or an absence of adjudication; the High Court cannot substitute its own view for that of the ARC.
Source reference: p.3–5, paras. 11–15The Court also relied on Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors., 2024:DHC:9322, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, 2025:DHC:11285, on the restricted scope of revisional scrutiny.
Source reference: p.4–5, paras. 12–14Further, under the principle reiterated in Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, a judicial or quasi-judicial authority must give reasons when dealing with material contentions; a bare conclusion cannot replace reasoned adjudication.
Source reference: p.7, paras. 20–21Reasoning
The High Court did not undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the Respondents’ bona fide requirement, consistent with the restricted scope of Section 25B(8) revision.
Source reference: p.5–6, paras. 15–17It examined only whether the ARC had properly considered the Petitioner’s material defence.
Source reference: no citationAlthough paragraph 29 of the impugned order listed the documents relied upon by the Petitioner and concluded that they did not disclose any triable issue, it did not analyse why the previous litigations were irrelevant to, or incapable of affecting, the Respondents’ plea of bona fide requirement.
Source reference: p.6–7, paras. 18–19Since the contention had been specifically raised and was potentially material to the leave-to-defend application, the unexplained rejection demonstrated an absence of meaningful adjudication and a material irregularity in the decision-making process.
Source reference: p.7–8, paras. 20–24The High Court therefore held that the issue required consideration by the ARC in the first instance, rather than determination by the High Court in revision.
Source reference: p.7, para. 22Holding
The Court held that the impugned order could not be sustained because the ARC had failed to provide reasons for rejecting the Petitioner’s contention concerning the previous litigations.
The order dated 17.12.2022 was accordingly set aside, and the matter was remanded to the learned ARC for fresh consideration of the application seeking leave to defend in accordance with law.
Source reference: p.8, para. 25In view of the eviction petition’s pendency since 2019, the ARC was requested to decide the applications expeditiously, preferably within eight months from the parties’ first appearance.
Source reference: p.8, paras. 26–28The parties were directed to appear before the ARC on 24.08.2026, and the revision petition and pending applications were disposed of accordingly.
Source reference: p.8, paras. 26–28Original Court PDF
Shri Narinder Kumar KhullarvsShri Rajesh Narula, & Ors.
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