Failure to prove misconduct after a vitiated enquiry warrants dismissal of Section 33(2)(b) approval application.

Shyam Sunder, a driver employed by the Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC), was charge-sheeted on 18 June 1992 for allegedly remaining absent without permission from 7 May 1992 onwards.

In his reply, he explained that his absence was attributable to his wife’s illness and stated that he had submitted leave applications through a co-worker.

The Enquiry Officer treated the reply as an admission of guilt and concluded the enquiry without recording further evidence.

DTC thereafter proposed removal, but the workman did not submit a reply to the show-cause notice and instead instituted a civil suit challenging the disciplinary authority’s competence; the suit was dismissed on 27 February 1993.

He was removed from service on 17 May 1993.

DTC sought approval of the termination under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The Industrial Tribunal held that the domestic enquiry violated principles of natural justice and was perverse, while granting DTC an opportunity to prove the alleged misconduct independently.

DTC failed to lead evidence proving the misconduct, although it produced evidence concerning payment of one month’s wages. The Tribunal consequently dismissed the approval application.

DTC challenged that order under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

The Court applied Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which requires an employer seeking approval of a dismissal or discharge during the pendency of industrial proceedings to establish the legality of the action, including the existence of the alleged misconduct, where the domestic enquiry is found invalid.

The Court also applied the principles of natural justice, holding that a disciplinary enquiry cannot treat an employee’s explanatory reply as an unequivocal admission of guilt or rely on management documents without affording the employee a fair opportunity to respond.

Under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, interference with an Industrial Tribunal’s award is limited to cases involving patent illegality, perversity, jurisdictional error, or an error apparent on the face of the record; the writ court does not ordinarily re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own factual conclusions.

The Court held that the workman’s reply did not amount to an unconditional admission of misconduct: although he admitted absence, he explained the circumstances by referring to his wife’s illness and asserted that leave applications had been submitted through a co-worker.

The Enquiry Officer therefore erred in closing the enquiry without recording further evidence and in treating the reply as conclusive.

The Tribunal’s finding that the enquiry was vitiated was also supported by its observation that management documents had been relied upon without giving the workman an adequate opportunity to explain them.

Since DTC did not challenge the Tribunal’s preliminary order and was expressly granted an opportunity to establish the misconduct before the Tribunal, it was required to prove the charge independently.

Its failure to lead evidence on the alleged misconduct was fatal to the approval application; proof of payment of one month’s wages did not establish the substantive charge.

The Tribunal’s conclusion was therefore a plausible factual and legal view, and no ground for writ interference was made out.

It upheld the Tribunal’s finding that the domestic enquiry was procedurally defective and that DTC failed to prove the alleged misconduct after being granted an opportunity to do so.

Finding no patent illegality, perversity, jurisdictional error, or error apparent on the face of the record, the Court dismissed the writ petition and affirmed dismissal of DTC’s application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Pending applications, if any, were also disposed of.