Failure to timely object to pecuniary jurisdiction bars challenging the decree during execution.

The petitioner, the eighth defendant and judgment-debtor in E.P.No.2221 of 2018, challenged the dismissal of E.A.No.2 of 2022 by the XXVI Assistant City Civil Court, Chennai, under Article 227 of the Constitution.

The underlying suit, O.S.No.4980 of 2011, was initially instituted on the Original Side of the Madras High Court.

The suit properties were admittedly situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the City Civil Court.

The petitioner and her mother had earlier filed I.A.No.116 of 2012 to set aside the ex parte decree and restore the counterclaim, but did not raise any objection regarding pecuniary jurisdiction; the application was dismissed for default on 23.01.2013.

The decree directed partition of the “A” and “B” schedule properties, restrained defendants 1 to 4 from dealing with those properties, and dismissed the counterclaim.

Whether the suit was improperly transferred from the Original Side of the Madras High Court to the City Civil Court merely because leave had been obtained under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent in respect of certain defendants residing outside the jurisdiction?

Whether the alleged excess valuation of the counterclaim deprived the City Civil Court of pecuniary jurisdiction and rendered the decree a nullity capable of being challenged for the first time in execution proceedings?

Whether the petitioner, as the eighth defendant, was not bound by or liable under the decree because the decree did not expressly identify her by name?

Clause 12 of the Letters Patent permits the High Court’s Original Side to entertain suits concerning land or immovable property situated within its jurisdiction; where the properties are so situated, leave concerning defendants residing outside the jurisdiction is unnecessary and does not prevent subsequent transfer to a competent subordinate court.

Section 21(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 requires an objection to pecuniary jurisdiction to be raised at the earliest possible opportunity and permits its consideration only where there has been a consequent failure of justice.

Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 similarly requires prejudice or failure of justice before a decree is interfered with on valuation or pecuniary-jurisdiction grounds.

The Court relied on Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan and Sneh Lata Goel v. Pushpalatha to distinguish objections relating to territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction from a fundamental absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter; the former do not ordinarily render a decree a nullity and must satisfy the statutory conditions.

Under Section 47 CPC, an executing court cannot go behind the decree, sit in appeal over it, or correct mere errors of law; only a decree that is void ab initio or inherently without jurisdiction is inexecutable, as reaffirmed in Hasham Abbas Sayyad, Mantoo Sarkar, Bhawarlal Bhandari and Brakewel Automotive Components.

A decree expressed against “all the defendants” binds each defendant unless otherwise excluded by its terms.

The Court held that the transfer was valid because the immovable properties were situated within the City Civil Court’s territorial jurisdiction.

Leave under Clause 12, even if granted in relation to certain defendants residing outside the jurisdiction, did not require the suit to remain on the Original Side, particularly after the City Civil Court acquired the relevant pecuniary jurisdiction.

The objection based on the counterclaim’s valuation was not an objection to subject-matter jurisdiction.

In any event, the petitioner had failed to raise it when she participated in I.A.No.116 of 2012, which sought to set aside the ex parte decree and restore the counterclaim.

She also failed to establish any consequent failure of justice or prejudice as required by Section 21(2) CPC and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act.

The counterclaim had been filed only by defendants 1 to 4, and the petitioner could not independently rely on its dismissal to invalidate the decree, especially when the counterclaimants themselves had not challenged the proceedings.

Finally, the decree’s direction that “all the defendants” were ex parte and the operative terms of the decree were sufficient to bind the petitioner; the absence of a separate reference to the eighth defendant did not exclude her from the decree.

The executing court therefore correctly declined to examine the alleged defects and to obstruct execution.

The alleged pecuniary-jurisdiction defect concerning the counterclaim was not a subject-matter jurisdictional nullity and, having not been raised at the earliest opportunity or shown to have caused failure of justice, could not be urged for the first time in execution.

The petitioner was bound by the decree as the eighth defendant, and execution against her was maintainable.

The connected Civil Miscellaneous Petition was closed, with no order as to costs.