"Fence-sitters" cannot claim retrospective appointment and seniority based on subsequent judicial pronouncements after inordinate delay.

The petitioner participated in the Police Constable Recruitment Test-2016 and was appointed as a Constable in the Special Armed Force (SAF) on 20.03.2017.

He accepted the appointment without objection and served for over five years.

In 2022, following the Supreme Court's decision in *Praveen Kumar Kurmi v. State of M.P.*, which addressed the migration of reserved category candidates to the general category based on merit, the petitioner filed a representation seeking a retrospective transfer to the District Police Force (his preferred choice) effective from 24.03.2017.

The State opposed the petition on the grounds of inordinate delay and laches.

1. Whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the legal proposition laid down in *Praveen Kumar Kurmi v. State of M.P.* despite a delay of more than six years in approaching the court.

2. Whether the petitioner can be classified as a "fence-sitter" whose belated claim would adversely affect the rights of third parties already appointed to the District Police Force.

The court primarily applied the doctrine of "Delay and Laches" in discretionary writ jurisdiction.

It relied on the principle from *BSNL v. Ghanshyam Dass (2011)*, which establishes that "fence-sitters" who do not approach the court timeously cannot claim relief granted to vigilant litigants if such relief upsets the accrued rights of others.

The court also distinguished the precedent of *Praveen Kumar Kurmi v. State of M.P.*, noting that the specific relief there was granted because a post had been kept vacant via an interim order since 2018, whereas no such vacancy existed here.

The court reasoned that while the legal principle in *Praveen Kumar Kurmi* regarding the placement of meritorious reserved candidates is undisputed, it cannot be invoked by a candidate who accepted a post without "demur" and remained silent for six years.

The petitioner's explanation—that he only filed the petition after the Supreme Court clarified the law in 2022—was rejected; the court held that subsequent judicial pronouncements do not automatically revive stale claims for those who were not vigilant.

Furthermore, unlike the *Kurmi* case where a seat was preserved by court order, granting relief to the petitioner now would necessitate displacing a third party who has already been appointed and is working in the District Police Force.

The court answered that the petitioner is a "fence-sitter" whose claim is barred by laches and that the mere passing of an order in a similar case does not entitle a non-vigilant party to similar relief.

The court declined to even direct a consideration of the petitioner's representation, noting that the delay was terminal.