Filing Suit on Last Day of Limitation Without Plausible Explanation Establishes Lack of Readiness and Willingness.

The first appellant, for herself and as guardian of the minor second appellant, executed a registered sale agreement (Ex.A1) to sell the property to the respondent for Rs. 7 Lakhs, receiving Rs. 4,50,000 as advance.

A performance period of three months was fixed. The respondent claimed that despite tendering the balance on 01.02.1998 and issuing a legal notice on 10.02.1998, the appellants demanded more money and evaded execution.

The respondent filed the suit for specific performance on 06.11.2000 (the last day of limitation).

The appellants contended the agreement was merely a security for a loan transaction of Rs. 2 Lakhs and was never intended as a sale.

Both the Trial Court and First Appellate Court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent.

1. Whether the Courts below erred in granting specific performance without adverting to the scope of Sections 16 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act, especially when the suit was filed on the last date of limitation without plausible explanation for the delay?

2. Whether the Courts below erred in granting relief despite a 33-month gap between the legal notice and the filing of the suit?

3. Whether the Courts were right in rejecting the "loan security" defense by relying on Section 92 of the Evidence Act without considering the proviso allowing evidence of the true nature of the transaction?

The court applied Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which mandates the plaintiff to aver and prove continuous "readiness and willingness" from the date of the contract to the time of the decree.

It analyzed Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, emphasizing that the relief of specific performance is discretionary and equitable.

Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, was applied regarding the three-year period for filing suits for specific performance.

The court also referenced the "welfare of the minor" principle regarding the disposal of minor's property by a natural guardian without court permission, as well as Section 149 of the CPC regarding the curation of deficit court fees.

The Court affirmed that the suit was not barred by limitation because the delay in paying court fees was condoned under Section 149 CPC, which relates back to the date of filing.

It also rejected the appellants' "loan security" defense, finding the registered agreement (Ex.A1) was intended to be acted upon based on the first appellant’s admissions as D.W.1.

However, the Court found that the respondent failed the mandatory test of "readiness and willingness" under Section 16(c). Although the respondent may have had the financial "readiness" (having eventually deposited the balance), he lacked "willingness" due to his conduct.

The respondent issued a legal notice in February 1998 but waited over two and a half years to file the suit. The Court categorized the respondent's explanation—that he waited out of sympathy because the first appellant was a widow—as a "fanciful version" that was "unacceptable and unsustainable" given that he already knew of her refusal and demand for more money in 1998.

Filing at the "fag end" of the limitation period without diligence indicated a lack of continuous willingness.

It held that while the suit was within the legal limitation period, the respondent was disentitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance because he failed to prove continuous readiness and willingness as required by Sections 16(c) and 20 of the Specific Relief Act. The suit in O.S.No.214 of 2011 was dismissed.