FIR against elderly in-laws quashed where allegations were vague, omnibus, and lacked specific overt acts.

The applicants invoked Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking quashing of FIR C.R. No. 11185002220445 dated 18 June 2022, registered at Dwarka Police Station, Devbhumi Dwarka, for offences under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Applicant No. 1 was the complainant’s mother-in-law and Applicant No. 2 her father-in-law; Applicant No. 3, the husband, was no longer part of the proceedings after the application was not pressed against him.

The FIR alleged that the applicants subjected the complainant to physical and mental cruelty, taunted and abused her, demanded dowry, and that Applicant No. 2 assaulted her and threatened her father over the telephone.

The applicants contended that the allegations were vague and omnibus, that they had lived separately from the complainant and her husband for approximately eight years, that they were over 70 years of age, and that the FIR was lodged after an unexplained delay.

The complainant opposed quashing, asserting that the applicants had aided, abetted and instigated the husband and that a prima facie case existed.

Whether the FIR and consequential proceedings disclosed a prima facie case against the applicant parents-in-law under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Whether the allegations were so vague, omnibus, improbable and lacking in specific instances of involvement that the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to prevent abuse of process.

Whether the FIR fell within the illustrative categories in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal warranting quashing of criminal proceedings.

The Court applied Section 482 CrPC, which empowers the High Court to quash criminal proceedings to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process.

It relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604, particularly the categories permitting quashing where the allegations, even if accepted at face value, do not constitute an offence; where the uncontroverted allegations do not disclose commission of an offence; where the allegations are inherently improbable; or where the proceeding is manifestly mala fide and instituted to wreak vengeance.

The Court further relied on Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, 2010 (0) AIJEL-SC 48656, concerning exaggerated and omnibus allegations in matrimonial prosecutions and the need for careful scrutiny.

The Court further relied on Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam v. State of Bihar, 2022 (0) AIJEL-SC 68351, concerning misuse of Section 498A IPC to implicate relatives in matrimonial disputes.

The Court further relied on K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana, (2018) 14 SCC 452, which held that relatives should not be proceeded against on the basis of omnibus allegations without specific instances of involvement.

Section 498A IPC requires cruelty involving wilful conduct likely to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, or harassment connected with an unlawful demand for property or valuable security.

The Court found that the allegations against Applicants Nos. 1 and 2 were general and omnibus and did not attribute a clear, distinct or specific role to either applicant.

The alleged dowry harassment and cruelty were unsupported by specific dates, incidents or particulars, and the Court held that scattered and remote incidents, without immediate proximity, did not sufficiently constitute cruelty.

The applicants’ advanced age, their separate residence from the complainant and her husband for approximately eight years, and the fact that the marriage had subsisted for more than 17 years further weakened the prosecution case concerning a continuing dowry-related offence.

Applying Bhajan Lal and the principles against prosecuting relatives on vague allegations, the Court concluded that the FIR did not inspire confidence against the applicants and that continuing the prosecution would amount to abuse of process.

The proceedings against Applicant No. 3, the husband, had already ceased to be pressed and were not adjudicated on merits.

The Court clarified that its observations were confined to the quashing application and would not prejudice any other proceedings between the parties; the Rule was made absolute and direct service was permitted.