FIR Based on Mere Suspicion and Delayed by 30 Months Lacks Prima Facie Basis for Section 307 Trial

The complainant alleged that on 11.04.2008, while he was at a traffic signal, the applicant drove his car rashly and negligently, leading the complainant to apprehend that the applicant intended to hit him

No collision occurred, and no injuries were sustained

The complainant did not file an FIR until 06.08.2011—a delay of 30 months—alleging an offence under Section 307 of the IPC based on a suspicion that the applicant held a grudge regarding a 2006 case from which the applicant had already been discharged

Following the charge-sheet, the applicant filed a discharge application under Section 227 of the CrPC, which was rejected by the Sessions Court on 21.04.2017

1. Whether the trial court erred in rejecting the discharge application when the FIR was based on mere suspicion and lacked evidence of mens rea or injury

2. Whether a criminal prosecution should continue when the materials on record fail to meet the judicial threshold of a prima facie case

The court primarily applied Section 227 of the CrPC, which mandates the discharge of an accused if the judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against them

mere suspicion, however strong, can never take the place of proof

the court emphasized the constitutional safeguard of a "fair trial," asserting that an individual should not undergo the burden of trial unless the prosecution establishes a prima facie case, and that continuing a groundless prosecution constitutes a "wastage of judicial time"

The court found that the entire case rested on the complainant’s suspicion that the applicant intended to cause harm due to past enmity

the investigation revealed that no injury was caused and no collision took place

The court noted a significant 30-month delay in filing the FIR, for which no adequate explanation was provided

there was "no any material or an iota of evidence" to establish mens rea (criminal intent) or any act toward committing murder under Section 307 of the IPC

The court reasoned that since the applicant had already been discharged in the previous case cited as the motive for the "grudge," the current prosecution was baseless and would result in unnecessary harassment

The Court quashed and set aside the order dated 21.04.2017 and allowed the discharge application (Exh. 3). The applicant, Manish Gopaldas Shah, was discharged from the offences punishable under Section 307 of the IPC, as no prima facie case was made out to justify the continuation of the trial