FIR Contents Not Provable Through Scribe if Informant’s Death Lacks Nexus to Crime Summary In this criminal appeal, the Court examined a conviction for murder originating from a 1990 incident involving a dispute over farm machinery. A primary legal issue was the evidentiary status of the First Information Report (FIR), as the informant had died of natural causes before the trial. The Court ruled that since the informant’s death had no nexus to the alleged crime, the FIR could not be treated as substantive evidence under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. While the scribe could verify the act of recording the statement, he could not prove the truth of its contents. Furthermore, the Court analyzed the prosecution's version of the shooting, which involved an improbable physical struggle where the accused allegedly used a victim as a human shield while firing multiple weapons. The Court found significant medical and logical inconsistencies, noting that the injuries sustained by the parties did not align with the described positions of the assailants and victims. Due to estasblished doubts regarding the manner of occurrence and the unreliable nature of the eye-witness accounts, the Court granted the appellant the benefit of doubt and set aside the conviction. Would you like the summary of the next segment of this judgment or another legal proceeding?

The appellants, Khalid and Nannu (now deceased), were convicted under Section 302/34 IPC for the murder of Sarafraz @ Pappu.

On January 7, 1990, the deceased was allegedly called to Khalid’s barn, where a dispute arose over borrowing a tractor-trolley.

The prosecution alleged that Nannu held the deceased while Khalid shot him with a pistol after a shotgun blast was deflected by the informant, hitting Nannu instead.

The informant, Wahiuddin, died before the trial, and the FIR was proved by the scribe, PW-1.

The appellants contended a cross-version: that the informant’s party were the aggressors who shot Nannu, and Sarafraz was accidentally killed by his own party’s fire while Khalid used him as a human shield.

1. Whether the First Information Report (FIR) can be treated as substantive evidence when the informant is dead and the death has no nexus with the reported incident.

2. Whether the prosecution proved the manner of occurrence and the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, noting that an FIR is not substantive evidence unless it relates to the cause of the informant's death.

Relying on Pradeep v. State of U.P. (2022) and Lalita v. Vishwanath (2025), the Court held that while a scribe can prove the factum of an FIR, they cannot prove its contents if the informant is dead and Section 32 is inapplicable.

The fundamental criminal law principle that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, as established in Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P.

The Court found the prosecution's narrative inherently improbable and noted the "oddity" of the informant, PW-2, and PW-3 following the deceased to the barn without prior hostility.

The Court observed that if Nannu had held the deceased from behind while a shotgun was fired at close range (even if deflected), it was "almost fantastic" that the pellets hit Nannu's legs without hitting the deceased.

Scientific evidence showed Nannu sustained pellet injuries, yet the deceased had none on his lower limbs, contradicting the prosecution's claim that they were in physical contact during the fray.

The non-proof of FIR contents (due to the informant's death) and the physical impossibility of the alleged assault created a grave cloud of doubt.

The Court held that the prosecution failed to meet the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt; the appeal was allowed, the conviction and life sentence were set aside, and Khalid was acquitted.

Appellant No. 2’s appeal had already abated due to his death.