FIR disclosing prima facie ingredients of extortion and triable factual issues cannot be quashed.

The petitioner filed a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (Section 528 of BNSS, 2023) seeking the quashment of FIR Crime No. 78 of 2021 registered at P.S. Mahila Thana, Ujjain, for offences under Sections 387, 419, and 506 of the IPC.

The complainant, Shahanaj Bi, alleged that during a matrimonial dispute involving her daughter, the petitioner impersonated the "President of the Human Rights Commission" and forcibly took ₹5,000.

It was further alleged that the petitioner demanded an additional ₹5,000 and threatened the complainant with death and her daughter with a forced divorce based on false allegations if the sum was not paid.

The petitioner contended she acted as a conciliator and the money was a legitimate consultation fee, claiming the FIR was a malicious attempt to avoid payment.

1. Whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, prima facie constitute the ingredients of the alleged offences or warrant quashment under the inherent powers of the Court

2. Whether the dispute is purely civil or professional in nature, or if it constitutes a criminal offence of extortion and criminal intimidation

The court primarily applied the guidelines established in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal (1992), which define specific categories where the High Court may exercise inherent powers to quash an FIR, such as when allegations do not disclose a cognizable offence or are manifestly malicious.

The court relied on Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra (2021), emphasizing that courts should not evaluate the merits of allegations at the investigation stage.

The court applied the definition of "Injury" under Section 44 of the IPC.

The court applied the definition of "Extortion" under Section 383 of the IPC, which require the intentional putting of a person in fear of injury to dishonestly induce the delivery of property.

The court cited Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P. (2023) regarding the duty of the court to scrutinize FIRs for ulterior motives or personal vendettas.

The court found that the FIR and the material collected during the investigation prima facie showed the petitioner's involvement in the alleged acts.

Applying Section 383 of the IPC, the court noted that the petitioner allegedly put the complainant in fear of injury (death and matrimonial harm) to induce the payment of ₹5,000, thereby satisfying the basic ingredients of extortion.

The court observed that the petitioner’s defenses—specifically whether she actually impersonated an official or if the complainant was genuinely alarmed—are questions of fact that must be determined during trial through evidence, rather than in a Section 482 proceeding.

Regarding the delay in filing the FIR, the court determined it was not excessive enough to render the case improbable, noting that the petitioner allegedly leveraged perceived police contacts to deter the complainant.

The court concluded that since the ingredients of the alleged offences were prima facie present, stultifying the prosecution at the initial stage would constitute an abuse of the process of the court.

The petition was dismissed.