First Appellate Court May Grant Eviction on Sole Reversal of Findings Absent Cross-Objections Under Order XLI Rule 33

The plaintiff (respondent) filed an eviction suit under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, against the defendant (appellant), a daily wager

The Trial Court granted an eviction decree solely on the ground of default in payment of rent, while leaving the issue of "reasonable requirement" effectively unadjudicated as it deemed further adjudication unnecessary

On appeal, the First Appellate Court reversed the finding on rent default but upheld the eviction by independently finding that the plaintiff had proved "reasonable requirement"

The appellant challenged this in the High Court, arguing that the First Appellate Court lacked jurisdiction to affirm a finding on reasonable requirement that the Trial Court had not explicitly granted

Additionally, there was a delay in filing the appeal due to a communication gap between the Hindi-speaking appellant and his Bengali-speaking advocate

1. Whether the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned given the linguistic and social background of the appellant

2. Whether the First Appellate Court, as the final court of facts, has the jurisdiction to grant an eviction decree on a ground (reasonable requirement) that was not specifically decreed by the Trial Court, even in the absence of a cross-objection

Section 5 of the Limitation Act regarding the condonation of delay based on "sufficient cause" arising from communication gaps

Section 107 and Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908. Rule 33 empowers an Appellate Court to pass any decree or order which ought to have been passed, and to make such further decree or order as the case may require, even if the respondent has not filed any appeal or cross-objection against a specific finding

The High Court first addressed the delay, noting that the respondent could not have personal knowledge of the appellant's private communications with his lawyer; given the language barrier and the appellant’s social status as a daily wager, the court found the "communication gap" a "plausible case" for condonation

On the merits, the court rejected the appellant's argument that the First Appellate Court overstepped its jurisdiction. It reasoned that under Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC, the First Appellate Court is the "last Court of facts" and possesses the same powers as the Trial Court

The court noted that the First Appellate Judge independently applied his mind to the evidence on record regarding reasonable requirement. Although the Trial Court’s initial handling of the burden of proof was legally questionable, the High Court held that the First Appellate Court’s independent appreciation of the evidence was valid and that minor discrepancies in terminology—such as using the word "affirming"—did not vitiate the judgment since the appellate court arrived at its own conclusion on the facts

Finding no "substantial question of law" as required for a second appeal, the court dismissed SAT 278 of 2025 under Order XLI Rule 11 of the CPC. CAN 2 of 2025 was disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs