Fixed-pay service of School Mothers must be counted as qualifying service for pensionary and retiral benefits.

The petitioner was appointed as a "School Mother" on a fixed-pay basis on December 14, 1989.

Her services were regularized effective October 1, 2007, and she subsequently superannuated on June 30, 2024.

Upon retirement, the respondents issued a Pension Payment Order (PPO) that excluded her previous fixed-pay service (July 25, 1990, to September 30, 2007) from the calculation of her qualifying service for pensionary benefits.

The petitioner submitted representations on December 29, 2025, and January 5, 2026, seeking the inclusion of this period based on established judicial precedents, but received no response.

Whether the service rendered by the petitioner on a consolidated fixed-pay basis as a School Mother ought to be counted as qualifying service for the purpose of computing pension, gratuity, and other post-retiral benefits.

The Court relied on the principle of parity and the doctrine of finality of judgments.

Specifically, it applied the precedent set by the Division Bench of the High Court of Tripura in *Smti. Mamata Rani Roy (Saha) v. The State of Tripura & Ors.* (WP(C) No. 77 of 2015), which held that fixed-pay service for School Mothers must be added to regular service for calculating pension.

This rule was further fortified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in *State of Tripura & Ors. v. Smriti Rani Acharjee & Anr.* [SLP (C) No. 32435-32438/2025], which dismissed the State’s challenge and confirmed that the *Mamata Rani Roy* judgment had attained finality.

The Court noted that the legal grievance raised by the petitioner—the non-inclusion of fixed-pay service for pensionary benefits—is an issue already settled by both the High Court and the Supreme Court in favor of similarly situated employees.

Since the petitioner had already filed detailed representations citing these binding precedents and the State's own compliance memorandum dated December 10, 2025, there was no active dispute on the merits of the legal entitlement.

The Court observed that the respondents had failed to dispose of these representations.

Consequently, rather than adjudicating the merits afresh, the Court found it appropriate to compel the administrative authorities to exercise their discretion in light of the established law.

The respondents are ordered to pass a decision within four weeks from the date of receipt of the judgment, taking into account the points raised by the petitioner and the governing law.

Liberty was granted to the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum should any grievance persist following the respondents' decision.