Forcibly disrobing a child with sexual intent constitutes sexual assault under Section 7 POCSO.

On 19 November 2016, the minor victim, aged approximately 10 years and born on 3 September 2006, was returning from a grocery shop when the appellant took her towards a field after gagging her mouth. He allegedly removed her undergarment and began removing his own clothes with the intention of committing rape. PW-4 arrived at the spot, found the victim and appellant in a partially undressed condition, and the appellant fled.

The victim’s statement under Section 164 CrPC, the testimony of PW-4, the evidence of witnesses who saw the appellant taking the victim towards the field, the school records proving her age, and the appellant’s medical report showing abrasions were relied upon by the prosecution.

The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 363 IPC and Section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act”), sentencing him to three years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹1,000 for each offence, with the sentences to run concurrently.

The appellant challenged the conviction, contending principally that the evidence did not establish sexual assault under Section 7 POCSO and that the conduct, if proved, amounted only to sexual harassment under Sections 11 and 12 POCSO.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant kidnapped the minor victim, thereby committing an offence under Section 363 IPC.

Whether forcibly taking the minor to an isolated field, removing her undergarment, and removing his own clothes constituted “sexual assault” under Section 7 POCSO, punishable under Section 8, even in the absence of specific evidence that the appellant touched the victim’s vagina, penis, anus, or breast.

Whether the appellant’s conduct was limited to “sexual harassment” under Section 11 POCSO, punishable under Section 12, rather than sexual assault under Sections 7 and 8 POCSO.

Whether the victim’s minority was proved by the school records and other evidence.

Section 363 IPC criminalises kidnapping from lawful guardianship. Under Section 2(1)(d) POCSO, a child is a person below 18 years of age. Section 7 POCSO defines sexual assault to include not only touching the vagina, penis, anus, or breast of a child, but also “any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration”; Section 8 prescribes its punishment. Section 11 defines sexual harassment, while Section 12 prescribes its punishment.

The Court relied on Attorney General for India v. Satish, (2022) 5 SCC 545, for the principle that the second limb of Section 7 is independently applicable to any act involving physical contact, when accompanied by sexual intent.

The Court also applied the principle that the credible testimony of the prosecutrix, when supported by surrounding circumstances and corroborative evidence, can sustain conviction.

The Court accepted the victim’s testimony as consistent and reliable. She stated that the appellant took her towards the field, removed her undergarment, and began removing his own clothes; her account was corroborated by PW-4, who found both of them partially undressed and rescued the victim, as well as by PW-5 and PW-6, who saw the appellant taking the victim towards the field.

The appellant’s abrasions, recorded during medical examination, were treated as supporting the prosecution version that force had been used.

The school register and the victim’s own evidence established that she was below 18 years of age.

On the POCSO issue, the Court held that Section 7 is not confined to physical contact with the specific sexual parts listed in its first limb. The phrase “any other act” covers acts involving physical contact when undertaken with sexual intent.

The appellant’s conduct—gagging the child, taking her to an isolated location, removing her undergarment, and removing his own clothes—formed a connected chain of circumstances from which sexual intent and physical contact could be inferred.

Accordingly, the conduct was not merely sexual harassment under Section 11; the absence of specific evidence of touching the enumerated body parts did not reduce the offence to Section 12 POCSO.

The appeal was dismissed; the appellant’s bail bond was cancelled, the sureties were discharged, and he was directed to surrender before the trial court within four weeks to serve the sentence, failing which he was to be taken into custody.